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A. INTERPRETATION
INCENTIVES MUST BE EXTERNAL—THE USFG CAN'T INCENTIVIZE ITSELF
Ruth Grant, - professor of political science at Duke University 02 (, “THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES: HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS,” Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002) 111)
Incentive' is sometimes used as if it were synonymous with `motivation' generally speaking. But there are several important sorts of motivation that are not suggested by the term. When we speak in this way, we implicitly deny the phenomena of habitual behavior, or action motivated by a sense of responsibility or of the reasonableness of a course of action (with reasonableness here understood as something other than individual utility maximization), or the way in which a role model or ideal can serve as motivator. Action which is initiated by the individual or understood as internally motivated is not really comprehended in the concept of motivation as incentive. Incentives are external prompts to which the individual responds. The use of `incentives' to speak of market forces is also problematic, though it is easy to see the logic of this development within the language of economics. If one company lowers the price of its product, we might readily say that other companies now have an incentive to lower theirs. But we would not say that the first company offered all other companies an incentive to lower their prices. Market forces are not conscious and intentional, and their rationale is intrinsic to the economic process itself. We might just as well say in this situation that the first company's lower price is a good reason for other companies to lower theirs given that they need to remain competitive. The term `incentive' says nothing that `reason' cannot say as well in this case.A similar logic applies to speaking of loan conditions as incentives. The International Monetary Fund may make a loan to a nation only on condition that it alter its inflationary policies. If the reason for the condition is intrinsic to the IMF's own financial aims, `incentive' may be a misnomer. Not everyone would support the distinction I am trying to maintain here. As I saidabove, the language has become ubiquitous and we do speak of market incentives. For example: `Incentives are the essence of economics. The most basic concept, demand, considers how to induce a consumer to buy more of a particular good; that is, how togive him an incentive to purchase. Similarly, supply relationships are descriptions of how agents respond with more output or labour to additional compensation'. When the IMF is criticized for using financial incentives unethically to control the internal policies of borrowing nations, it is because the critics suspect that its real purposes are political rather than strictly limited to the legitimate concern to secure the financial health of the Fund. The distinction between market forces and incentives can be illustrated further by considering the difference between wages as compensation and incentives as bonuses in employment. Compensation means `rendering equal', a `recompense or equivalent', `payment for value received or service rendered', or something which `makes up for a loss' ± as in the term `unemployment compensation'. Compensation equalizes or redresses a balance, and so, to speak of `fair compensation' is entirely sensible. But to speak of a `fair incentive' is not. An incentive is a bonus, which is defined as something more than usually expected, that is, something that exceeds normal compensation. It is an amount intentionally added to the amount that would be set by the automatic and unintentional forces of the market. An incentive is also a motive or incitement to action, and so an economic incentive offered to an employee is a bonus designed to motivate the employee to produce beyond the usual expectation. It should be obvious then, that compensa-tion and incentives are by no means identical. The per diem received for jury service, for example, is a clear case of compensation which is not an incentive in any sense. It is not difficult to see how it might have happened that the boundaries were blurred between the specific conception of incentives and conceptions of the automatic price and wage-setting forces of the market. Both can be subsumed under very general notions of the factors that influence our choices or motivate action, and `incentives' carries this general meaning as well. Nonetheless, the blurring of that boundary creates a great deal of confusion. Incentives, in fact, are understood better in contradistinction to market forces than as identical to them. It is only by maintaining a clear view of their distinctive character that the ethical and political dimensions of their use are brought to light.Moreover, conceptual clarity and historical understanding go handin hand in this case. It should no longer be surprising to find that theterm `incentives' is not used by Adam Smith in first describing theoperation of the market, but appears instead at a time when the market seemed inadequate in certain respects to the demands presented bychanging economic circumstances. Other eighteenth and nineteenthcentury ideas, often taken as simple precursors of contemporary analysesof incentives, can now be seen in their distinctive character as well. Forexample, Hume and Madison offer an analysis of institutional design I am indebted to Bradley Bateman for this point.which differs significantly from `institutional incentives', though the two are often confused. These thinkers were concerned with preventing abuses of power. They sought to tie interest to duty through institutional mechanisms to thwart destructive, self-serving passions and to secure the public good. Contemporary institutional analyses, by contrast, proceed without the vocabulary of duty or public good and without the exclusively preventive aim. Institutional incentives are viewed as a means of harnessing individual interests in pursuit of positive goals. Similarly, early utilitarian discussions, Bentham's in particular, differ markedly from twentieth century discussions of incentives despite what might appear to be a shared interest in problems of social control. Again, Bentham is interested entirely in prevention of abuses or infractions of the rules. The rationale for his panopticon is based on the observation that prevention of infractions depends upon a combination of the severity of punishment and the likelihood of detection. If the latter could be increased to one hundred per cent, through constant super-vision and inspection, punishment would become virtually unnecessary. This is a logic that has nothing whatever to do with the logic of incentives as a means of motivating positive choices or of encouraging adaptive behavior. We are now in a position to identify a core understanding or a distinctive meaning of the concept of incentives; what we might call incentives `strictly speaking'. Incentives are employed in a particular form of negotiation. An offer is made which is an extrinsic benefit or a bonus, neither the natural or automatic consequence of an action nor a deserved reward or compensation. The offer is usually made in the context of an authority relationship ± for example, adult/child, employer/employee, government/citizen or government/organization. The offer is a discrete prompt expected to elicit a particular response. Finally and most importantly, the offer is intentionally designed to alter the status quo by motivating a person to choose differently than he or she would in its absence. If the desired action would result naturally or automatically, no incentive would be necessary. An incentive is the added element without which the desired action would not occur. For this reason, it makes sense to speak of `institutional incentives' when referring to arrangements designed to encourage certain sorts of responses. `Perverse incentives' is also an expression that implies that incentives are meant to direct people's behavior in particular ways. Amartya Sen notes that, in contrast to the arguments of Montesquieu and Steuart that interests can serve as a check on evil passions, `interests are given a rather different ± and much more `positive' ± role in promoting efficient allocation of resources through informational economy as well as the smooth working of incentives' in contemporary theories. Amartya Sen, foreword to Albert O. Hirschmann (1997, p. xi). Central to the core meaning of incentives is that they are an instrument of government in the most general sense. The emergence of the term historically within discourses of social control is illustrative of this point.

B. Violation—the plan gives incentives to an agency within the federal government
C. A priori voter for fairness and jurisdiction
    1. Ground—moots disads with links to incentivizing the private industry, such as bizcon, competitiveness DAs, and politics

    1. Unpredictable limits—there are infinite agencies and sub-agencies that they can claim advantages off of; we can't research each one

    1. Competing interps is only way to prevent judge intervention and preserve clash on T

























Solvency

Hydrogen fuel cells are more expensive and inefficient than gasoline
Joseph J. Romm, assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy during the Clinton administration and author of he Hype about Hydrogen: Fact and Fiction in the Race to Save the Climate, published by Island Press, March 17, 2004, “Hype about Hydrogen”, Technology Review published by MIT, __http://www.technologyreview. com/Energy/13518/page2/__ [Bapodra]
It's Expensive
In a "hydrogen economy," the main energy carrier would be hydrogen that is produced from pollution-free sources of energy. This goal rests on two pillars: a pollution-free source for the hydrogen and a device for cleanly converting this hydrogen into useful energy (the fuel cell).
Hydrogen is not a readily accessible energy source like coal or wind. It is bound up tightly in molecules like water (H20) and natural gas (primarily composed of methane, or CH4) so it is expensive and energy-intensive to extract and purify. More than 95 percent of U.S. hydrogen is produced from natural gas today because that is the cheapest method. Yet delivering hydrogen from natural gas to the tank of a fuel-cell car in usable form costs four times as much as gasoline with an equivalent amount of energy. Hydrogen from pollution-free sources, such as renewables, is even more expensive. A hydrogen infrastructure built around existing or near-commercial technologies would cost more than $600 billion, according to the most comprehensive study done, by the Argonne National Laboratory.
Fuel cells are small, modular, electrochemical devices, similar to batteries, but which can be continuously fueled. A fuel cell takes in hydrogen and oxygen and puts out electricity and heat; its only "emissions" are water. This sounds like an energy panacea-but today, more than 160 years after the first fuel cell was built, and after more than $15 billion in public and private spending, fuel cell technology still has not achieved major commercial success.

High power fuel cells are too expensive and difficult to re-supply
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, December 9, 2006, “Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence”, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ dod/jason/fossil.pdf
3. Fuel-Cell vehicles- Fuel cell vehicles provide direct conversion of fuel to electricity. They have demonstrated high bench-top efficiency (> 50%) relative to the typical ICE powerplants (15-25%). Hydrogen fuel cells have no (vehicle) GHG emissions, though their upstream GHG emissions can be large, as well as their emissions from in-vehicle-produced reformed hydrogen. Fuel cells are low power density systems, if the required thermal-management systems are included. Fuel cells generally scale poorly to high power densities on a mass basis. Lowtemperature fuel cells are poisoned by fuel impurities such as sulfur and carbon monoxide and, as a consequence, require highly purified fuel. Additionally, even if the fuel feedstock were suitably purified, introduction of these contaminants into the air intake of a fuel cell vehicle rapidly poisons the catalyst and immobilizes the vehicle. Current H2-based fuel cells have prohibitive catalyst costs, of order $100K-$1M, for 100 kW power plants, typical of busses, heavy-duty cars, or trucks, for example. Additionally, such fuel cells have very expensive membrane costs with no longterm (i.e., 1-year) durability and/or warranty. Another drawback of H2-fuel-cell based vehicles is the logistics train that would be required to supply the gas-phase fuel, H2, to theater. Canisters to contain H2 gas are large and heavy; an obvious flammability and, under some conditions, an explosion and detonation liability would exist throughout the logistics train. On-board H2 storage also requires much larger mass (weight) or volume than liquid fuels. This drawback would deleteriously impact vehicle range, military performance, and supply-chain logistics of such a system.
Fuel cells technology isn’t reliable nor mature
Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, December 9, 2006, “Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence”, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ dod/jason/fossil.pdf
C. Decreasing DoD fuel use Hybrid vehicles are optimized for intermittent/stop and go use patterns with fuel-consumption benefits that are anticipated in that driving environment. Hybrid vehicles offer little or no fuel-economy benefits if the average power expended is close to the peak-power capability of the powerplant. Hence, hybrids offer much more fuel consumption savings in the commercial sector than in the typical DoD (Army) pattern of vehicle use. JASON finds no significant foreseeable DoD role for allelectric vehicles. These vehicles have possible applications in the limit of short-range, low-friction terrain, if the vehicles are very light weight, and for special-purpose missions such as robotic vehicles. Most of these applications are outside (current) DoD patterns of use. Similarly, JASON sees no significant DoD use for fuel-cell vehicles on any reasonable time horizon. These vehicles are very costly and the technology is not mature. We also do not see a good mechanism by which the fuel to power them could be supplied to theater. As such, JASON does not anticipate that they will play a role in DoD tactical or combat vehicles in the foreseeable future.




































Elections DA

Obama is winning because he can control the framing on energy
Andrew Ward, 6-22-08
“Energy concerns could swing Ohio result”, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 235879bc-4098-11dd-bd48- 0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid= f2b40164-cfea-11dc-9309- 0000779fd2ac.htm[Ian Miller]
Richard Daley hoped he would spend more time at his Kentucky vacation home in retirement. Instead, the 60-year-old former engineer, has cut his number of visits by half because of the soaring cost of driving the 200 miles from his home in West Chester, Ohio. “On a fixed income, we just can’t keep absorbing these increases,” he says. Mr Daley is one of millions of Americans rethinking their approach to energy consumption as petrol prices hit record levels. According to the Department of Transportation, US drivers travelled 30bn fewer miles between November and April, compared with a year earlier, the biggest drop since the 1979 energy crisis. While Mr Daley’s story is increasingly familiar, his carries added weight because he lives in one of the most important battleground states in November’s presidential election. His heavily Republican county on the edge of Cincinnati helped deliver George W. Bush’s narrow victory in Ohio four years ago and John McCain needs to win by a big margin there if he is to hold the state. Describing himself as an undecided independent, Mr Daley supports Mr McCain’s plan to lift the ban on fresh offshore oil and gas drilling around the US coast. But he also favours Barack Obama’s proposal to levy a windfall profit tax on oil companies and invest the proceeds in renewable fuels: “We need to exploit all the oil we have, but, in the long term, we have to find alternatives,” says Mr Daley. Energy has soared towards the top of the election agenda as petrol prices have topped $4 a gallon for the first time. Three in four voters say the issue will be “very important” in determining their vote – outranking taxes, terrorism and the Iraq war – according to a recent poll by the Pew Research Centre. Asked who they trusted most to handle the energy issue, respondents favoured Mr Obama over Mr McCain by 18 percentage points.Voters are making the simple conclusion that if you change the party in the White House somehow things will get better,” says Larry Sabato, a political scientist at the University of Virginia.


McCain wants the country to develop and improve Hydrogen-powered vehicles
Sean Whaley, Review-Journal Capital Bureau. 07/30/2008. “Stumping in Nevada: McCain focuses on energy.” __http://www.lvrj.com/news/ 26090259.html__ [Takumi Murayama]
McCain said the country should use its expertise to develop and improve alternative energy technologies, from hydrogen-powered vehicles to solar-powered electric plants.


The plan dooms Obama. McCain will pounce on a new energy policy to revitalize the GOP brand – it will tip the election
(Theo Caldwell, President of Caldwell Asset Management, Inc/ investment advisor in the United States and Canada, 6-17-08, “Theo Caldwell: If the Republicans promise to cut fuel costs, 2008 could be their year”, http://network.nationalpost. com/np/blogs/fullcomment/ archive/2008/06/17/theo- caldwell-if-the-republicans- promise-to-cut-fuel-costs- 2008-could-be-their-year.aspx, [Ian Miller])
Drill here, drill now, pay less. This is the mantra of former U.S. speaker of the house Newt Gingrich, whose American Solutions policy group is campaigning for America to begin tapping its own oil resources to combat high gas prices. For all the environmental constraints the U.S. government has placed on domestic oil production (China and Cuba are drilling closer to the U.S. coastline than American companies are allowed to do), polls show Americans would rather pay less for gasoline than fight global warming. Indeed, the price of gas now permeates almost every policy discussion, from foreign affairs to inflation. As we approach the 2008 elections, whichever presidential candidate and party conjures a cogent energy plan — incorporating domestic drilling and defying environmental alarmism — will be rewarded. At first glance, it would seem that spiralling gas prices and frustration at the pumps would hurt the incumbent party. Notwithstanding the Democrats’ majorities in both houses of Congress, it is the Republican party that the public identifies with incumbency, saddled as they are with an unpopular president who catches blame for everything from poor Iraq war planning to inclement weather. But the religious environmental zealotry of much of the Democrats’ base makes them the party of windmills and stern lectures, not practical solutions. Congressional Democrats have contented themselves with browbeating today’s most politically correct villains, oil executives, while reflexively voting down any proposed energy solution, from domestic drilling to nuclear power. The Democrats’ presidential candidate, Senator Barack Obama, has suggested that high energy costs might carry the benefit of forcing America to change its gluttonous ways, recently chiding his countrymen: “We can’t drive our SUVs and eat as much as we want and keep our homes on 72 degrees at all times ... and then just expect that other countries are going to say OK.” Americans did not win the Cold War so they would have to consult Sweden before setting their thermostats. This kind of thinking is anathema to the Land of the Free, and it opens the door for the GOP to capitalize on the energy issue. In 1994, Gingrich’s Republicans achieved a majority in Congress through a simple, common sense platform known as the Contract with America. A one-page roster of eight reforms and 10 proposed Acts, the Contract neatly answered voters’ principal questions of those who seek to govern. To wit, who are you, what do you hope to accomplish, and how will you do it? In 2008, with energy prices fixing to become the top election issue, combining foreign and domestic policy concerns into a monstrous hybrid of a problem, an understandable and workable proposal could help the GOP again. If every Republican running for office, from freshman House candidates to their presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, spoke with a single, sensible voice on this issue, they could snatch victory from defeat. A first draft might read: “We are Americans too, and we know that energy prices have gotten out of hand. We want to reduce fuel costs for all of us, and cut the number of dollars we send to hostile, oil-producing countries in the Middle East and South America. If you elect us, we will do the following three things: We will begin to tap America’s vast oil reserves, using technological drilling advances that protect the environment. We will also promote alternative energy sources, such as nuclear power, to move us away from an oil-based economy. Finally, we will eliminate barriers to the import of cheaper, more efficient automotive systems that have been successful in other parts of the world.” If the Republicans agree on such a platform, 2008 could be their year after all.



McCain would start wars on every continent
Doug Bandow –Washington based political writer and analyst; 7-18-08; Foreign Follies, “John McCain: The Candidate of god – Mars, the god of war http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/ ?articleid=13154
It is fine to think of the unborn. But how about the born? Shouldn't conservatives who claim to be Christians care about the human impact of the foreign policy advanced by the presidential candidates? James Dobson declared that "What terrifies me is the thought that" Obama might end up as military commander-in-chief. But, in truth, the really terrifying thought is of John McCain at the ready to invade, bomb, coerce, and threaten other nations as his heart, or temper, moves him. After all, he, not Obama – at least, maybe not quite as much – sang about bombing Iran, even though it is years away from creating, let alone deploying, an atomic weapon. He, not Obama, wrote an article suggesting an assault on North Korea, despite the risk of triggering a full-scale war. He, not Obama, clamored for a ground offensive against Serbia in the needless war over Kosovo a decade ago. He, not Obama, supported the invasion of Iraq, which has turned out so differently than promised by most of its advocates. He, not Obama, wants to preserve obsolete American military occupations and mount counterproductive military interventions around the globe. Many foreign policy questions are largely prudential – what policies advance the interests of the United States? That cannot be the only question asked, but it is an essential standard by which to measure America's foreign actions. And all of the wars and occupations backed by McCain fail the test of serving America's interests. Washington policymakers might like them. But treating war as a discretionary activity, and one guaranteed to lead to group hugs and mass flower tosses, is practically foolish and morally grotesque. In fact, Christians overseas have proved to be among the greatest victims of the Bush administration's aggressive military actions. Iraq's historic Christian community has been destroyed, with up to half of the population forced into exile, internally or abroad. Sadly, few American Christian leaders, many of whom backed the war, have owned up to their responsibility for the catastrophe which has enveloped Iraq's Christians. There is an additional irony when social conservatives crusade for war: can there be a more anti-family program than initiating a conflict which kills parents, leaves kids without fathers and even mothers, spurs divorce and family break up, and steals parents from children's lives for an extended period, time and time again? It is one thing to claim that necessity sometimes requires paying such a cost. But none of John McCain's wars was or is necessary. It has become obvious to all but the most unregenerate neoconservative that Iraq posed no threat to America. Unleashing the dogs of war on Iraq, killing hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, wounding even more of them, and driving millions of them into exile, while utterly destroying the fabric of Iraqi society, certainly was not humanitarian, even though Saddam Hussein's removal was a plus. U.S. intelligence doesn't believe Iran even has an ongoing nuclear weapons program, and Tehran certainly is not poised to create a nuclear arsenal. The idea of attacking Iran before actually testing the possibility of a negotiated settlement is obscene. And the practical consequences of war would be hideous. North Korea is dismantling the reactor that would be the most likely target of U.S. military action, obviating the purpose of such a strike. Anyway, committing an act of war against the unpredictable totalitarian regime of Kim Jong-il would risk sparking full-scale war, which would have catastrophic consequences for all concerned, and South Korea in particular. The attack on Serbia was unprovoked, the geopolitical interests at stake were frivolous, and the intervention was hypocritical. At the same time the U.S. initiated war to resolve a minor guerrilla war among white Europeans, it ignored much larger and more costly conflicts in Africa. Nevertheless, John McCain sees war as a solution to potentially any geopolitical situation. The spectacle of religious conservatives backing John McCain's veritable policy of a war on every continent is even more bizarre given Christianity's message of peace. Christian theologians have argued for centuries over the legitimacy of serving in the military and going to war. The dominant view reflects some sense of Just War theory, that under specific and narrow circumstances, war is justified. In practice, alas, clerics could always be found to pronounce almost every war to be just and necessary, turning Just War theory into more an excuse for than limit on war. Still, despite the spirited case for neo-pacifism made by some Christians, it is hard not to countenance national self-defense just as most Christians accept personal self-defense. But this really means self-defense, not romping around the globe attempting to micro-manage the affairs of other nations at the point of a gun. If God acknowledges cases in which the moral good is better served by going to war than surrendering to evil, it likely is a very reluctant acknowledgement, for war is the embodiment of evil: committing death and destruction writ large, wrecking entire countries and continents, and targeting God's creation, human and natural. No wonder Jesus Christ declared in the Sermon on the Mount, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God." (Matthew 5:9) Thus, making peace obviously is better than making war. While the latter sometime might be unavoidable – when the consequences of any alternative course are far worse – most often it is not. And even when war might be theoretically justified, resolving the controversy peacefully if possible would still be far preferable. But if there is one thing John McCain is not, it is a peacemaker. He sees war and the threat of war, backed by an even larger military – bigger than today's already largest, most sophisticated, most powerful armed forces on earth – as a simple tool to be promiscuously deployed not just against smaller powers such as Iraq, but serious states, such as China and Russia. His policy of confrontation all the time, everywhere, may be favored by the usual neoconservative suspects, but is likely to generate conflict and war, and perhaps protracted conflict and catastrophic war.
Such a policy would seem inconsistent with Christian teaching. Forget general injunctions for peace. Most wars turn into widespread murder and theft, behaviors proscribed by the Ten Commandments, as well as other Biblical teachings. While war sometimes brings out the best and most heroic in people, it far more often brings out the worst and most base personal characteristics. In short, it is something Christians should strongly resist, not welcome.
















Security K
Our fear of the “inevitable attack” on the US allows descisons to be made on lies and deception to instill fear into the public justifying our actions in the name of national security
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.


Our invasion of Iraq reflects the web of deception that the Bush administration, through its "war on terrorism," has woven around the events of that September morning. By all objective evidence Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, but as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested on the day after the attacks, the broad definition of that "war" would require us to invade Iraq. At that moment, Iraq rose to the surface from the deeper dreams and visions of our leaders— and so the moment became one of opportunity. To facilitate that policy our leaders then either made, or encouraged by innuendo, the false claim that Iraq was indeed implicated in 9/11, and by the time of the invasion about 50 percent of Americans had come to believe that falsehood. A deception on such a large scale could only occur because Americans remained genuinely fearful of terrorist attacks even more lethal than 9/11, and because that fear, that sense of vulnerability, could be manipulated to support larger and more ambitious policy aims. It became possible to redirect the fear from Osama bin Laden to another hated Middle Eastern figure, Saddam Hussein, to the point where the two became virtually interchangeable. If anything, American fear of another 9/11 has been intensified by the "successful" invasion and so remains available for use in other situations.


The paranoia of inevitable annihilation associated with superpower syndrome – legitimizes violence under the mask of “security”.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Inseparable from this grandiosity is the paranoid edge of the apocalyptic mindset. Leader and followers feel themselves constantly under attack—threatened not just with harm but with annihilation. For them that would mean the obliteration of everything of value on this degraded planet, of the future itself. They must destroy the world in order to survive themselves. This is why they in turn feel impelled to label as absolute evil and annihilate any group that seems to impede their own sacred mission. Such a sense of paranoid aggressiveness is more readily detectable in the case of certified zealots like Asahara or bin Laden. But it is by no means absent from the minds of American strategists who, though possessing overwhelming military dominance, express constant fear of national annihilation, and embark upon aggressive or "preemptive" military actions.

America’s obsession with trying to prevent and stop conflict – fueled by the fear of vulnerability and the unknown legitimizes violent acts to take place in the name of security eventually leading to inevitable extinction.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.


The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are energized by versions of intense idealism; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American "infidels." Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I've come to think of as "superpower syndrome." By that term I mean a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate; the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world's only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower’s victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are never absent in any part of the world. -- The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy.

The Alternative is to vote negative – the text is to begin our interrogations of security by refusing the affirmative’s quest for stability.
Accepting and living with ambiguity and vulnerability is key to preventing violence.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.


To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.






































States CP

Plantext: The state and federal territorial governments should provide incentives to the United States military for the development and production of hydrogen fuel cells for the United States military.

Observation 1: Competition
The counter-plan is non-topical and competes through net-benefits.
Observation 2: Solvency
Their own cards support (or at least don’t detract from) the counterplan’s solvency. Ruttan 06 card applies to the counterplan—some of the examples it provides were private companies creating military technology. Dunn 2K describes commercial hydrogen fuel cells working effectively. Zimet 03 says “scientists and engineers in the labs have been the core developers of technologies of little commercial interest, such as high-power radar, stealth, and reactive armor”—this card isn’t about commercially viable products like hydrogen fuel cells. Their NRAC 02 card never says that private companies fail, just that research isn’t seen as profitable. That won’t be an issue because our counterplan will give companies incentives and a built-in customer.
Nearly all the states offer tax credits and loans to reduce fossil fuel usage
Greg McDonald, Staff Writer, 2/14/02 “States Offering More Energy Incentives” __http://www.stateline.org/live/ ViewPage.action?siteNodeId= 136&languageId=1&contentId= 14731__
At least 43 states now have financial programs aimed at moving consumers away from reliance on fossil fuels. The programs range from personal and corporate tax credits to rebates, loans and sales tax moratoriums. Nineteen states encourage investment by providing money for model projects. Fourteen states have laws mandating that a certain percentage of electricity be derived from renewable sources. And 34 states have regulations that require utility companies to accommodate renewable energy systems to help reduce monthly power bills.