we are running states cp, politics (obama good scenario), security K, WTO DA, and case
the WTO da is the same shell from the trade generic
the states cp is the same shell from the generic.
cp text: The states and federal territorial governments should provide long-term contracts to synthetic fuel developers to develop algae biofuel compatible with current aircraft and blended with Jet Propulsion-8 for the United States Air Force.
the politics shell is the same as the one in the generic
the security K shell is up on the wiki under KO negs.

case
EMPHASIZING AIR POWER TRADES OFF WITH GROUND FORCES—MAKES THE MILITARY TOO UNBALANCED TO LAUNCH OFFENSE

Dary G. Press, Assist Prof Gov Dept, Rsrch Flw @ Rockefeller, Assoc. John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001, "the myth of air power in the persian gulf war and the future of warfare" International Security Vol 26 No 2, President andFellows of HarvardCollege andthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [JWu]


My interpretation of the Gulf War, in contrast, paints a more complicated picture of the emerging relationship between air and groundforces. Air power failedto neutralize the Iraqi groundfor ces because destroying a largely static, defensive force from the air is inherently difficult, even in the era of information- age intelligence andpr ecision-strike weapons. The lesson of the Gulf War is not that air power is a weak instrument of national military power, but that the capabilities of air power against mechanizedgr oundfor ces on the offensive are substantially greater than air power’s capabilities against defensive forces. The implication of my analysis for U.S. foreign policy is that air power may play a decisive role in future U.S. operations to halt an enemy’s mechanizedassault on a U.S. ally. It will not likely be decisive, however, if the United States or its allies needto conduct an offensive to take enemy-controlledterritory. For example, if North Korea attacks South Korea, or if Iraq invades Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, U.S. air assets may play a leading role in the destruction of the invading forces. But if the U.S. objective in these contingencies is to launch a counteroffensive into North Korea, or to once again evict Iraq from Kuwait, air power will be far less effective against defensively orientedNorth Korean, or Iraqi, forces. The force structure implications of this analysis are straightforward: If the United States envisions launching offensive operations to defeat its enemies, it will still require a balanced military that includes substantial heavy ground forces. Overemphasizing air assets may prove
very costly.9




US hegemony in East Asia hurts US-China relationsWu Xinbo, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, September 2000 (“U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations”, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/ cnaps/papers/2000_wu.htm)Three major factors have constantly troubled Sino-U.S. relations in the post-Cold War era: human rights, trade, and security. With the de-linking of China's human rights record from its MFN treatment in 1994 and the closing of Beijing-Washington marathon negotiations on China's WTO membership in 1999, human rights and trade may subside as major sources of tension on the bilateral agenda. Security issues, emerging in the mid-1990s, now appear to be the most important factor affecting bilateral relations. Due primarily to differences in their worldviews, historical experiences and capabilities, China and the U.S. have diverging conceptions of security, which in turn has led to their different security practices. Chinese and U.S. security interests in Asia both converge and diverge, and as the U.S. begins to contemplate China as a latent adversary, such divergence will become even more conspicuous. While both sides will continue to pursue their own security interests in Asia, each country also has to adapt itself to the changing political, economic and security landscape in this region. To enable durable, peaceful coexistence, both sides will have to make certain shifts in their current security policies. To address these questions more directly, this paper first considers some of the U.S. misperceptions about China's policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific and certain important conceptual differences on security practices between Beijing and Washington. Then, the study explores how China perceives the U.S. impact on its security interests. Finally, the paper concludes with a few policy recommendations as to how China and the United States could manage the bilateral relationship more effectively. Misperceptions and Conceptual Differences One popular perception in the U.S. about China's long-term policy objectives in Asia is that Beijing aspires to be the regional hegemon and would like to restore a Sino-centric order in this part of the world. This observation is wrong. First, Beijing believes in the trend of multipolarization rather than unipolarization at both global and regional levels, and predicts that with continued economic development and growing intra-regional political consultation in Asia, influence on regional affairs will be more diversified and more evenly distributed. Secondly, even though China expects some relative increase in its influence in Asia, it understands that because of the limits of its hard power and especially its soft power, China can never achieve a position comparable to its role in the ancient past or to the U.S. role in the region at present. Another misperception is that in the long run China will endeavor to drive the U.S. out of East Asia. Again this is not a correct assumption. From Beijing's perspective, the United States is an Asia-Pacific power, although not an Asian power, and its political, economic and security interests in the region are deep-rooted, as are its commitments to regional stability and prosperity. In fact, Beijing has always welcomed a constructive U.S. role in regional affairs. At the same time however, Beijing also feels uneasy with certain aspects of U.S. policy. As a superpower, the United States has been too dominant and intrusive in managing regional affairs. It fails to pay due respect to the voices of other regional players, and sometimes gets too involved in the internal affairs of other states, lacking an understanding of their culture, history and values. While there is no danger of the U.S. being driven out of East Asia, its current policy may result in the U.S. wearing out its welcome in the region, thus undermining its contributions to stability and prosperity. In addition to the above misperceptions about China's regional intentions, the United States and China also hold diverging conceptions of national and regional security. Hegemonic stability vs. security cooperation In the post-Cold War era, Washington has been advocating an Asia-Pacific security structure with the U.S. as the sole leader and with U.S.-led bilateral alliances as the backbone. This is in essence hegemonic stability. Beijing believes, however, that regional security rests on the cooperation of regional members and a blend of various useful approaches (unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, institutional and non-institutional, track I and track II, etc.), not just on one single country and a set of bilateral security alliances. Breakdown of US-Chinese relations will cause a black swan that starts the next global war- economic interdependence doesn’t checkNiall Ferguson, Professor of history and business administration at Harvard, Citywire, July 3, 2007, p. Lexis The breakdown of Chinese American relations over an issue such as Taiwan could be another cause of a black swan. It would also mirror the circumstances setting off World War One when Germany and England sacrificed the height of free trade to attack each other. Economics were irrelevant. The assassination of Serbian Archduke Ferdinand in June 1914 was more important for financial market liquidity than the 1929 stock market crash, Ferguson asserted. World financial markets closed for five months after the murder from 1 August to 1 January, 1915 while they didn't close during the Great Depression. War between the US and China would likely involve nuclear weapons and result in hundreds of millions of deathsThe Internationalist, May 26, 2007, p. http://www.abytheliberal.com/ world-politics/united-states- vs-china-consequences-of-a- nuclear-warIf we take more realistic standards, a nuclear war between China and USA would result in much higher casualties for both sides. One would most likely obliterate the other or worse, both countries would be destroyed before a truce or victory call could be reached. It is most likely US would suffer most because majority of its 300 million population lives in the major cities which are in China’s missile targets (as a deterrance to US). China would suffer similar casualty in terms of numbers, however in terms of percentage of population it would hurt less than US. In short neither country wants a war with the other, the casualties and destruction being the strongest deterrents. The capability of China defend itself and strike back hard in case of an attack built a strong incentive for USA to try a hand diplomatic solutions to problem rather than foreign policy based in economic and military warfare, blackmails, threats and destabilising governments.

and we'll read more defense if time