Spending and politics are in generics.

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A. UNIQUE INTERNAL LINK
EUROPE OPPOSES NMD NOW, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION KEY TO PASSAGE
PBS 2K "MISSILE DEFENSE POLITICS" pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/ july-dec00/nmd_8-24.html [JWU]
And overseas, there has been a growing drumbeat of opposition. Many foreign leaders argue that a U.S. missile defense system would provoke an arms race and challenge historic understandings built on deterrence and international treaties. French President Jacques Chirac said building the system would "retrigger a proliferation of weapons, notably nuclear missiles." German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said, "Everything that goes in the direction of proliferation is a bad direction. I'm skeptical." And the chief of foreign policy for the European Union, the former head of NATO, Javier Solana, said recently, "If the decision on deployment is taken without agreement with Russia and without help from European leaders, it will be very badly taken." They, along with the Russians and Chinese, worry that an American missile defense system would give the U.S. global military dominance. But if it's to be built, allied concurrence is essential, because radars will have to be stationed in Greenland and Great Britain, as Secretary of Defense William Cohen explained recently.
WILLIAM COHEN: In order to have a technologically effective system, we need to have the support of our allies. If we don't have the support of our allies with respect to forward-deployed x-band radars, you will not have an effective technologically reliable system.


B. EUROPE ASKING U.S. TO CHANGE GAS EMISSION POLICIES
WASHINGTON TIMES 5-26-08 http://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2008/may/26/us- pressed-for-emissions-cuts-by- 20/[JWu]
KOBE, __Japan__ (AP) — European and developing countries urged the United States and Japan yesterday to commit to deep cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions by 2020 — a step they say is needed to defuse a coming ecological disaster caused by global warming. The calls at a meeting of environment ministers from the __Group of Eight__ industrialized nations in Japan coincided with rising concern that momentum is draining from __U.N.__-led efforts to force a new climate-change agreement by a December 2009 deadline.


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C. PISSES OFF RUSSIA
Vladimir Volkov International Editorial Board member of WSWS 18 July 2008 http://www.wsws.org/articles/ 2008/jul2008/miss-j18.shtml [JWU]

The US and the Czech Republic signed an agreement July 8 in Prague for the deployment of radar and anti-missile systems on the territory of this Eastern European country. The pact has become one more step in sharpening geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia. It evoked a stormy response from Moscow.
Signed by American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg, the agreement is opposed by about 70 percent of Czech citizens. Its defenders justify the agreement by pointing to the need to defend Europe from possible Iranian missile attacks. However, the Russian side insists that the true target of creating an infrastructure of anti-missile defense in Eastern Europe is not Iran, but Russia. If the plan is realized, then the military and political positions of Russia would be weakened.
A statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on the next day said that "the Russian side in such a situation will take adequate measures to compensate for potential threats to its national security." This statement referred not to "diplomatic, but military-technological methods."
Speaking on July 15 in the Kremlin at a meeting with representatives of the diplomatic corps, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said: "Placing elements of a global anti-missile system by the US in Eastern Europe only deepens the situation, and we will be forced to react to this adequately."
He declared that Russia's national security could not be maintained simply by the good word of its partners, and he accused Washington of "gradually undermining... the strategic stability in relations between our countries."


D. IMPACT: US-Russian relations key to preventing nuclear terror

David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, July 12, 2006, "The Future Obit of US Russian Relations", Speech: US State Depart . David, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, "The Future Orbit of US Russian Relations", Speech: US State Department, July 2. [T-Jacob]

Our cooperation will include the physical protection of nuclear materials, suppressing illicit trafficking of those materials, responding and mitigating the consequences of any acts of nuclear terrorism, and cooperating on the development of the technical means to combat nuclear terrorism, denying safe haven to terrorists, and strengthening our national legal frameworks to ensure the prosecution of such terrorists and their supporters. This initiative serves U.S. national security interests. We have invited partner nations to meet in the fall to elaborate on and endorse a statement of principles for this initiative. It's one we hope to expand.

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Capital-intensive, state directed alternative energy co-opts alternative lifestyles and counterculture possibilities into the corporate mainstream
Leigh Glover, PhD, Assistant Professor and CEEP Policy Fellow; 2006, "From love-ins to logos: charting the demise of renewable energy as a social movement", pp249-270. http://ceep.udel.edu/energy/ publications/2006_es_love-ins_ to_logos.pdf [JWu]
Contemporary renewable energy technologies were researched and developed effectively beginning in that era. Much of the early experimentation with sustainable energy was outside the state and corporate spheres, conducted in personal, communal, and academic contexts. A small amount of post-war experimentation was greatly supplemented by an explosion of activity in the later 1960s. The business sector became involved in the development and manufacture of commercial products toward the latter part of this period, most notably where this involved discrete machinery or components (wind turbines, solar cells, and solar thermal heaters). Renewable energy companies were usually small and independent of conventional energy corporations and utilities. Applications of the technology were isolated, small, privately or communally owned, usually domestic or agricultural, and often "hobbyist" in character. Alternative technologies of greatest interest at the time were amenable to investigation and application with low levels of investment: PV, small wind, small hydro, and bio-digestion. On the other hand, technologies such as tidal power and geothermal energy were in the inaccessible "big science" league.
Alternative energy was effectively a subculture in this period, much of it independent of government and corporate involvement. There was widespread information on these technologies through various outlets, including
magazines (for example, in the U.S., Organic Gardening and Farming, Environment Action Bulletin, and Home Power) and importantly, through the social network of the counter culture. Much individual experimentation
took place and there was great innovation. As with many nascent technologies, amateur curiosity was an initial motivation, and little capital was involved. With the OPEC oil embargo of the 1970s, renewable energy garnered
wider attention, and the interest of governments and the scientific establishment validated the potential of this technology as a "solution to the energy crisis." And this same decade essentially marked the end of renewable energy's first phase.
If we allow that technology has social roots (Winner, 1977, 1986; Bijker et al., 1987; McGinn, 1990), and that renewable energy expanded outside obvious corporate and state sponsorship (Butti, 1980), then what social forces and social goals shaped this technology? Renewable energy received its first widespread applications and use in the industrial economies through the followers of alternative lifestyles. Today this phrase invites derision and has
been co-opted to serve a number of political interests, but at the time it meant those wanting to live outside the mainstream. Rejecting the confines of conventional life in the developed world, individuals and groups experi-
mented with a variety of alternative social choices in living arrangements, property ownership, farming, material consumption, entertainment, drugs, marriage, education, transport, health, religion, and a plethora of other dimensions of social life. It was always loose, as social movements are want to be, and difficult to fix in any absolute sense.



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This massively consumerist alternative energy divides environmentalists, slows environmental gains, and props up exploitative capitalism
Leigh Glover, PhD, Assistant Professor and CEEP Policy Fellow; 2006, "From love-ins to logos: charting the demise of renewable energy as a social movement", pp249-270. http://ceep.udel.edu/energy/ publications/2006_es_love-ins_ to_logos.pdf [JWu]
Environmentalists divided over this development according to their ideologies. Pragmatists, for example, welcome the support that the renewablesbased economy would receive from giant energy corporations, taking these
developments as proof of the efficacy of the renewable energy cause (Flavin and Lenssen, 1994; Brown et al, 1991; Brown, 2004). On the other hand, skeptics have doubted that corporations will genuinely promote a renewablesbased economy, and speculate that the corporate elite may even use their influence to slow its arrival (Scheer, 2002). All environmentalists accept that corporations are responding to the profit motive in their industry investments. Caution by both parties may be necessary at this stage, for although the energy giants have made considerable expenditures on renewable energy, these amounts are minor in their overall budgets and operations.7
More than the actual scale of corporate investment, at stake is what to make of a renewable energy future steered by corporate strategy and state policy. It is offered here that this development represents the "ecological modernization" of renewable energy.8 While the state has dabbled in renewable technologies for quite some time, these efforts have been highly publicized and generally of little significance. Almost no national energy system in the developed world has managed to get beyond a couple of percent of its energy supplies or meet any significant portion of its major energy service needs from renewable sources. Yet, with the entry of large energy corporations into the field, the responsibility of the state is changed and its provider role for the interests of "capital-in-general" is evoked. Now the state will work more assiduously to provide the regulatory, policy, and political settings that will assist the development of the renewables-based economy. Doubtless the state's task of easing the way for renewable energy is made politically gentler if the conventional energy corporations also own the renewable energy enterprises.


Ontological damnation; extinction
Michael Zimmerman Prof Philosophy at University of Tulane 93 Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, Pg. 119-120

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth." This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing ones relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur in an ontological clearing through which life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one dimensional disclosure to entities virtually denies that any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring. Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material happiness" for everyone by reducing nature into pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in a nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided a nuclear war only to survive as contended clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead.




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The aff's framing of new technologies as clean and renewable alternatives overwhelms the basic question of consumption. Rather than basing our plan on support for alternative energy, we advocate alternatives to energy.
Michael Maniates, Professor Poli Sci, Environ Sci; B.S. Conservation and Resource Studies, M.A. & PhD Energy and Resources, Director of Allegheny Energy and Society prgrm, Inst. for Study of World Politics Fellow, Aug 2001 "Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?" Global Environmental Politics; Vol. 1 Issue 3, p31-52 [JWu]
But then the tone changes. Having introduced ideas of "consumption limits" and "manufactured needs," Speth dispenses with them. It is better to reflect upon the patterns of consumption, he says—that is, the mix of products made in environmentally destructive ways compared to those that are manufactured in environmentally "sustainable" waysthan on absolute levels of consumption itself. For those troubled by consumption, he argues, the best mix of policies are those that expand the economic production of the poor and maintain it for the rich while reducing overall environmental impact through the dissemination of environmentally benign technologies. One solves the consumption problem, in other words, by getting rich consumers and poor alike to demand eco-technologies. Remarkably, after promising to help forge "consumption patterns that are more environmentally friendly," it takes the Human Development Report just five paragraphs to establish its disdain for any discussion of overall limits to consumption, paths to more fulfilling, lower-consuming lifestyles, or the insidious dynamics of consumerism and manufactured needs. Indeed, the critical importance of challenging consumerism, which Speth alludes to in his forward, is never again broached in the remaining 228 pages of the document. The Human Development Report can be a splendid resource for those wrestling with the complexities of international economic development. I criticize it to show how inquiry into consumption quickly bumps up against tough issues: consumerism, "manufactured needs," limits, global inequity, the specter of coercion, competing and sometimes conflicting understandings of human happiness. Dealing with these topics demands a practiced capacity to talk about power, privilege, prosperity, and larger possibilities. IPAT, despite it usefulness, at best fails to foster this ability; at worst, it actively undermines it. When accomplished anthropologist Clifford Geertz remarked that we are still "far more comfortable talking about technology than talking about power,"33 he likely had conceptual frameworks like IPAT squarely in mind. Proponents of a consumption angle on environmental degradation must cultivate alternatives to IPAT and conventional development models that focus on, rather than divert attention from, politically charged elements of commercial relations. Formulas like IPAT are handy in that they focus attention on key elements of a problem. In that spirit, then, I propose a variation: "IWAC," which is environmental Impact = quality of Work X meaningful consumption Alternatives X political Creativity. If ideas have power, and if acronyms package ideas, then alternative formulations like IWAC could prove useful in shaking the environmentally- inclined out of their slumber of individualization. And this could only be good for those who worry about consumption. Take "work" for example. IPAT systematically ignores work while IWAC embraces it. As The Atlantic Monthly senior editor Jack Beatty notes, "radical talk" about work—questions about job security, worker satisfaction, downsizing, overtime, and corporate responsibility—is coming back strong into public discourse. 34 People who might otherwise imagine themselves as apolitical care about the state of work, and they do talk about it. IWAC taps into this concern, linking it to larger concerns about environmental degradation by suggesting that consumeristic impulses are linked to the routinization of work and, more generally, to the degree of worker powerlessness within the workplace. The more powerless one feels at work, the more one is inclined to assert power as a consumer. The "W" in IWAC provides a conceptual space for asking difficult questions about consumption and affluence. It holds out the possibility of going beyond a critique of the "cultivation of needs" by advertisers to ask about social forces (like the deadening quality of the workplace) that make citizens so susceptible to this "cultivation."35 Tying together two issues that matter to mass publics—the nature of work and the quality of the environment—via something like IWAC could help revitalize public debate and challenge the political timidity of mainstream environmentalism. Likewise, the "A" in IWAC, "alternatives," expands IPAT's "T" in new directions by suggesting that the public's failure to embrace sustainable technologies has more to do with institutional structures that restrict the aggressive development and wide dissemination of sustainable technologies than with errant consumer choice. The marketplace, for instance, presents us with red cars and blue ones, and calls this consumer choice, when what sustainability truly demands is a choice between automobiles and mass transit systems that enjoy a level of government support and subsidy that is presently showered upon the automotive industry.36 With "alternatives," spirited conversation can coalesce around questions like: Do consumers confront real, or merely cosmetic choice? Is absence of choice the consequence of an autonomous and distant set of market mechanisms? Or is the self-interested exercise of political and economic power at work? And how would one begin to find out? In raising these
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(Continued from above)
uncomfortable questions, IWAC focuses attention on claims that the direction and pace of technological development is far from autonomous and is almost always political.37 Breaking down the widely held belief (which is reinforced by IPAT) that technical choice is "neutral" and "autonomous" could open the floodgates to full and vigorous debate over the nature and design of technological choice. Once the veil of neutrality is lifted, rich local discourse can, and sometimes does, follow.38 And then there is the issue of public imagination and collective creativity, represented by the "C" in IWAC. "Imagination" is not a word one often sees in reflections on environmental politics; it lies among such terms as love, caring, kindness, and meaning that raise eyebrows when introduced into political discourse and policy analysis.39 This despite the work of scholars like political scientist Karen Litfin that readily shows how ideas, images, categories, phrases and examples structure our collective imagination about what is proper and what is possible. Ideas and images, in other words, and those who package and broker them, wield considerable power.40 Susan Griffin, an environmental philosopher, argues the same point from a different disciplinary vantage point when she writes that: Like artistic and literary movements, social movements are driven by imagination. . . . Every important social movement reconfigures the world in the imagination. What was obscure comes forward, lies are revealed, memory shaken, new delineations drawn over the old maps: it is from this new way of seeing the present that hope emerges for the future . . . Let us begin to imagine the worlds we would like to inhabit, the long lives we will share, and the many futures in our hands.41 Griffin is no new-age spiritualist. She is closer to rough-and-tumble neighborhood activist Saul Alinsky than ecopsychologists like Roszak, Gomes, and Kanner.42 She is concerned with the political implications of our collective sense of limited possibility and daunting complexity. She dismissed claims so prevalent in the environmental movement that a "healed mind" and "individual ecological living" will spawn an ecological revolution. Her argument, like Litfin's, bears restating: ideas and the images that convey them have power; and though subtle, such can and is exercised to channel ideas into separate tracks labeled "realistic" and "idealistic." Once labeled, what is taken to be impossible or impractical—" idealistic," in other words—can no longer serve as a staging ground for struggle. Conclusion IWAC is more illustrative than prescriptive. It draws into sharp relief the fact that prevailing conceptualizations of the "environmental crisis" drive us towards an individualization of responsibility that legitimizes existing dynamics of consumption and production. The recent globalization of environmental problems— dominated by natural-science diagnoses of global environmental threats that ignore critical elements of power and institutions—accelerates this individualization, which has deep roots in American political culture. To the extent that common-place language and handy conceptual frameworks have power, in that they shape our view of the world and tag some policy measures as proper and others as far-fetched, IWAC stands as an example of how one might go about propagating an alternative understanding of why we have environmental ills, and what we ought to be doing about them. A proverbial fork in the road looms large for those who would seek to cement consumption into the environmental agenda. One path of easy walking leads to a future where "consumption" in its environmentally undesirable forms—"overconsumption," "commodification," and "consumerism"—has found a place in environmental debates. Environmental groups will work hard to "educate" the citizenry about the need to buy green and consume less and, by accident or design, the pronounced asymmetry of responsibility for and power over environmental problems will remain obscure. Consumption, ironically, could continue to expand as the privatization of the environmental crisis encourages upwardly spiraling consumption, so long as this consumption is "green."43 This is the path of business-as-usual. The other road, a rocky one, winds towards a future where environmentally concerned citizens come to understand, by virtue of spirited debate and animated conversation, the "consumption problem." They would see that their individual consumption choices are environmentally important, but that their control over these choices is constrained, shaped, and framed by institutions and political forces that can be remade only through collective citizen action, as opposed to individual consumer behavior. This future world will not be easy to reach. Getting there means challenging the dominant view—the production, technological, efficiency-oriented perspective that infuses contemporary definitions of progress—and requires linking explorations of consumption to politically charged issues that challenge the political imagination. Walking this path means becoming attentive to the underlying forces that narrow our understanding of the possible.


CASE
1. Reprocessing hurts the environment
Frank N. von Hippel, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. 09-28-01. "Plutonium and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel," Science Vol. 293. no. 5539, pp. 2397 – 2398.
Commercial reprocessing continues on a large scale in Britain and France and, on a small scale, in Russia and Japan. The principal foreign customers for British and French reprocessing services have been German and Japanese utilities. Domestic political opposition to expanded at-reactor spent-fuel storage or central storage sites made shipment of spent fuel abroad for reprocessing their only alternative to shutting down their reactors. Storage of spent fuel is cheaper, safer, and more environmentally benign than reprocessing, which produces multiple types of radioactive waste that must be stored in any case, but host communities require assurances that interim spent-fuel storage will not become permanent (11).
Last year, the German government agreed to allow extended spent-fuel storage at reactor sites if, by mid-2005, German nuclear utilities end shipments of spent fuel abroad for reprocessing (12). Japan's utilities too are ending foreign reprocessing but are completing a ¥2.4 trillion (about US$20 billion) reprocessing plant that was committed in 1980. Because of the large number of high-paying jobs, the reprocessing plant is more acceptable to the local government than a stand-alone, interim, spent-fuel storage pool (13, 14).
Given the loss of foreign customers, the continuation of the costly reprocessing of domestic spent fuel is being questioned in both Britain and France. A French government study concluded that, if France stops reprocessing in 2010, it will save 28 to 39 billion francs (US$4 to 5 billion) over the remaining lifetime of its current fleet of power reactors (15).
With the indefinite postponement of commercial breeder reactors, the plutonium that has been separated by commercial reprocessing has become a disposal problem. As of the end of 1999, this still-growing stockpile amounted to about 200,000 kg (the equivalent of 25,000 Nagasaki bombs) (16).


The proliferation environment has changed making it impossible for the U.S. to identify prolif channels and methods
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center's Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author
As nuclear proliferation has become a more serious and urgent problem—both in terms of actual and would-be proliferators and the increased diversity of proliferation channels and methods—the performance of U. S. intelligence in meeting the challenge has appeared to be increasingly inadequate. The failure to foresee the Indian nuclear test, the underestimation of the Iraqi nuclear program prior to the Gulf War of 1991, the over-estimation of Iraq's program prior to the U.S.–led invasion of 2003, and the failure to detect many of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network throughout the 1990s all suggest that major efforts need to be made to reform the intelligence community in general and its handling of the problems of nuclear proliferation (and terrorism) in particular.
The focus of public attention has largely been on the false positives that appeared to justify the invasion of Iraq. Yet, it is arguable that the failure to provide early detection of the operations of the A.Q. Khan network was an equally important intelligence failure—and one where the constraints on intelligence collection and analysis were not as formidable as in Iraq. At the same time, the failure to detect the activities of the Khan network is understandable. The proliferation environment has changed significantly, becoming much more complex and posing more difficult challenges than in the past.

The proliferation environment has changed making it impossible for the U.S. to identify prolif channels and methods
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center's Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author
As nuclear proliferation has become a more serious and urgent problem—both in terms of actual and would-be proliferators and the increased diversity of proliferation channels and methods—the performance of U. S. intelligence in meeting the challenge has appeared to be increasingly inadequate. The failure to foresee the Indian nuclear test, the underestimation of the Iraqi nuclear program prior to the Gulf War of 1991, the over-estimation of Iraq's program prior to the U.S.–led invasion of 2003, and the failure to detect many of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network throughout the 1990s all suggest that major efforts need to be made to reform the intelligence community in general and its handling of the problems of nuclear proliferation (and terrorism) in particular.
The focus of public attention has largely been on the false positives that appeared to justify the invasion of Iraq. Yet, it is arguable that the failure to provide early detection of the operations of the A.Q. Khan network was an equally important intelligence failure—and one where the constraints on intelligence collection and analysis were not as formidable as in Iraq. At the same time, the failure to detect the activities of the Khan network is understandable. The proliferation environment has changed significantly, becoming much more complex and posing more difficult challenges than in the past.


Bush and GNEP nuclear programs allow prolif and create dangerous waste
Jim Harding, retired professor of environmental and justice studies and author of Canada's Deadly Secret: Saskatchewan Uranium and the Global Nuclear System, Sep 24th, 2007, "NUCLEAR SMOKE AND MIRRORS FROM ALBERTA TO AUSTRALIA: The AECL's Advanced Candu and Bush's Global Nuclear Partnership" [Bapodra]
Beholding to huge federal subsidies, AECL is also beholding to U.S. President George Bush with his $405 million brainchild, the GNEP. The only thing "global" about this plan is the U.S. pretence to world hegemony, which seems delusional after the Iraq debacle. And the only partners to this proposed "global" plan would be countries already in the nuclear weapons club, along with their uranium suppliers. The agreement would make it mandatory for uranium suppliers to take back spent fuel from reactors abroad. The bargaining chip would be allowing enrichment facilities and nuclear power plants that use spent fuel in these countries. Some chip. We'd get to throw more public money down the nuclear drain, create and store even more dangerous nuclear waste, and have less capital to create truly sustainable, renewable energy systems to avert even more catastrophic climate change.

Nuclear power is NOT inevitable—it's unwanted because efficiency and other renewables are cheaper solutions
Jim Harding, retired professor of environmental and justice studies and author of Canada's Deadly Secret: Saskatchewan Uranium and the Global Nuclear System, Sep 24th, 2007, "NUCLEAR SMOKE AND MIRRORS FROM ALBERTA TO AUSTRALIA: The AECL's Advanced Candu and Bush's Global Nuclear Partnership" [Bapodra]
It's no accident that the GNEP is spearheaded in countries refusing to support the Kyoto Accord. Kyoto sets targets for reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs), which mostly come from fossil fuels. However, business and government interests in oil-dependent countries (including countries like Canada, i.e. Alberta, dependent on exporting oil) don't want anything to slow down their profit and royalty-gushing ventures. Meanwhile efficiency, geothermal, wind and solar electricity are proving to be the most cost-effective ways to quickly lower GHGs, which doesn't sit well with the nuclear industry's comeback strategy of stressing itself as the clean alternative to fossil fuels. Furthermore, the 2001 Climate Change Conference in Bonn rejected nuclear as a solution to climate change partly because nuclear will steal capital from the cheaper, less risky, more effective renewable alternatives. So the nuclear industry is primarily looking to the countries outside Kyoto for support. It helped when George Bush's 2005 Energy Bill gave another $13 billion subsidies to the industry, and a privatized electrical market allowed U.S. nuclear plants to displace "stranded costs" on to the consumer. And it certainly helped AECL when the Harper government, continuing the Liberal practice of bailing out the nuclear industry, provided millions to design the ARC.

a. Nuclear plants kill millions of fish.
Vicki Wolf, Writer for Clean energy, "The Dirt on Nuclear Power", http://www.cleanhouston.org/ energy/features/nuclear2008. htm, 2008
Nuclear energy is being promoted as clean energy. While it's true that nuclear power plants don't emit green house gases that fuel global warming, the mining of uranium to fuel these plants is anything but clean. Water use is another issue. Millions of gallons of water per minute are boiled in the process of making electricity. In that process millions of fish are killed and all aquatic life is strained before the water is returned to its source. The yet unsolved nasty problem of long-term disposal of dangerous radioactive spent fuel is perhaps the greatest deterrent of all to nuclear power as a viable energy source.Fish larvae and other forms of aquatic life are strained from the water as it travels through thousands of metal tubes to become steam that turns the turbines to make electricity, then back through the system to be cooled and returned to its source. A 2005 study found that one coastal power plant in Southern California impinged nearly 3-and-a-half million fish in just one year.
b. Fish key to biodiversity. Lack of biodiversity is detrimental.
Karl Blankenship, Editor of the Bay Journal (huge fishing bay periodical), December 2006, "Loss of biodiversity a threat to future of world's fisheries", (http://209.85.215.104/search? q=cache:dFfXSBnsIuIJ:www. bayjournal.com/article.cfm% 3Farticle%3D2955+fish+ important+factor+in+ biodiversity&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd= 1&gl=us)
The cumulative loss of large fish—sharply reduces the ability of sea life to resist diseases, filter pollutants and rebound from stresses such as overfishing and climate change, the scientists said. If current trends continue, the scientists predict a global collapse of fish stocks in the middle of the century—an argument disputed by other fishery scientists. "Whether we looked at tide pools or studies over the entire world's ocean, we saw the same picture emerging," said Boris Worm of Dalhousie University, the lead author of the paper. "In losing species, we lose the productivity and stability of entire ecosystems. I was shocked and disturbed by how consistent those trends are—beyond anything we suspected." The study did not involve new research, but relied on existing data collected in studies around the world. The scientists examined results from dozens of controlled small-scale studies in coastal areas that manipulated aquatic populations in local areas. The studies showed that on average, the greater the species diversity in an area, the greater its production and stability—a pattern that was reversed as species were removed. They saw the same picture emerge when looking at regional coastal areas. The healthiest systems had higher rates of biodiversity. But areas that lost species—or where populations of critical species such as filter-feeding animals or seagrasses had been dramatically reduced—were more susceptible to harmful algae blooms, eutrophication, fish kills, beach closures and other problems. Turning their attention to large ocean areas, the scientists drew on long-term fisheries records, and concluded that large marine ecosystems with greater diversity of fish species were less prone to stock collapses than areas with fewer species. "We were all kind of blown away by the consistency of the patterns that we see from the smallest to the largest scales," said Emmett Duffy, a fisheries scientist at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, and one of the paper's 14 co-authors. "The global fisheries data mirror the kinds of patterns that we see in small controlled experiments, and in fact are predicted by simple general theory." Conservationists and many scientists have long argued that maintaining species diversity—including small, overlooked species which may unknowingly play important ecological roles—is important for healthy, functioning ecosystems. The Science paper sought to apply that concept to broader marine systems. "The basic analogy is that an ecosystem is sort of like a machine, and that you need a lot of the parts interacting with one another to support what it does," Duffy said. "What it does in our case is produce fish and crab harvests, oysters and clean waters. You need a lot of those other inconspicuous species that we don't think about much to provide sort of a natural infrastructure that supports the products that we take out. When you start losing the parts of that machine, it breaks down." In the Bay region, for instance, a die-off of seagrasses in the 1930s closed the bay scallop fishery as the beds, which were critical habitat for the scallops, quickly declined. Likewise, Duffy said, the demise of oysters in the Bay led to a loss of habitat for a variety of reef-dependent species, and the loss of the oysters' filtering ability contributed to poorer water quality in the Chesapeake. Conversely, the scientists said, systems that maintain healthy and diverse populations are more productive, and bounce back from disturbances more readily. "The main thing about the loss of species is there is this web of complex interactions that starts getting fouled up when species are lost," Duffy said. "And that ultimately ripples out to affect the things that we care about like fish production and clean water." A more controversial conclusion of the study was a projection which, using collapsed fish stocks as a proxy for loss of diversity, indicates that wild fish stocks being used for seafood would face global collapse by 2048. "There are some good arguments about biodiversity," Doug Lipton, an economist and fisheries scientist with the University of Maryland, said of the paper. But he said the fisheries prediction was based on a "big if"—that fisheries would continue to collapse at the same rate as in the past. In fact, he said, other factors, such as the economics of different fisheries, affect overfishing. And the biology of some species—such as those with low reproductive rates—make them more susceptible to overfishing than others. "The species that are most susceptible to collapse have already collapsed," he said. Ed Houde, a fishery scientist with the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science who has served on many national and international committees dealing with fishing issues, agreed that "fisheries have serious problems, we all know that." But, he added "in the year 2048, short of an asteroid hitting the Earth, I think we'll still have some pretty productive fisheries." In particular, Houde—in an point also cited by others—faulted the assumption in the paper that a stock was "collapsed" if harvests were 10 percent of their historic highs. Often, peak harvests for many species are not indicators of abundance, he said, and many peak catches were dramatically above sustainable levels. It's probable, Houde said, that catches that were only 10 percent of historic levels may be the appropriate harvest rate for some species now being regulated. Globally, he said, fish management has improved and become more precautionary, and U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization figures show that the number of fish stocks in trouble is slowly being reduced. Regionally, he said, a more precautionary approach to fisheries management can be seen in the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission's recent action to cap menhaden catches in the Bay, despite its own stock assessment which indicated the coastwide menhaden stock was healthy. "That was an ecosystem approach that was taken because we were worried about food for predators and the ecosystem services of filtering by menhaden," Houde said. "We made a social decision that was a precautionary one, recognized ecosystem services and capped the fishery." Other scientists have argued that, especially in coastal areas, pollution is a major—and potentially larger—threat to biodiversity than over fishing. While that may be true for coastal areas including the Bay, Duffy said overfishing is almost certainly the more important factor affecting biodiversity in oceans. Outweigh on quals, these people monitor fish population and shit for a living in one of the finest fisheries in the world.



States counterplan text:

The states and municipal governments should substantially increase all necessary funding for development and implementation of non-PUREX nuclear closed fuel cycle reprocessing facilities in the United States.



1NC T RENEWABLES



A. Interpretation
Alternative energies must be renewable
US department of interior,
7/16/08 "Alternative energy programs, definitions" Minerals Management Service __http://www.mms.gov/offshore/ AlternativeEnergy/Definitions. htm__

Alternative energy: Fuel sources that are other than those derived from fossil fuels. Typically used interchangeably for renewable energy. Examples include: wind, solar, biomass, wave and tidal energy.


B. Violation—x isn't renewable


C. Vote neg for competitive equity and jurisdiction

A.
Ground—our disads link to switching off from non-renewable energies; their aff moots these disads

B.
Topic education—renewable versus nonrenewable is the heart of the topic; aff must affirm renewable energy


C.
Predictable limits—they allow alternative uses of coal, oil, and gas; not neg burden to indict fossil fuels

D.
Case list—we allow 5 cases; they allow oil shale, reprocessing fuel; gas efficiency; synthetic hydrocarbons; methane hydrates, and other sketchy things