Topicality – alternative energy incentives
A. Interpretation – Algae biomass fuels are not renewable alternatives to energy
ScienceDaily, July 6, 2005, Ethanol And Biodiesel From Crops Not Worth The Energy, < releases/2005/07/050705231841. htm>
ScienceDaily (July 6, 2005) — ITHACA, N.Y. -- Turning plants such as corn, soybeans and sunflowers into fuel uses much more energy than the resulting ethanol or biodiesel generates, according to a new Cornell University and University of California-Berkeley study. "There is just no energy benefit to using plant biomass for liquid fuel," says David Pimentel, professor of ecology and agriculture at Cornell. "These strategies are not sustainable."Pimentel and Tad W. Patzek, professor of civil and environmental engineering at Berkeley, conducted a detailed analysis of the energy input-yield ratios of producing ethanol from corn, switch grass and wood biomass as well as for producing biodiesel from soybean and sunflower plants. Their report is published in Natural Resources Research (Vol. 14:1, 65-76). In terms of energy output compared with energy input for ethanol production, the study found that: * corn requires 29 percent more fossil energy than the fuel produced; * switch grass requires 45 percent more fossil energy than the fuel produced; and * wood biomass requires 57 percent more fossil energy than the fuel produced. In terms of energy output compared with the energy input for biodiesel production, the study found that: * soybean plants requires 27 percent more fossil energy than the fuel produced, and * sunflower plants requires 118 percent more fossil energy than the fuel produced. In assessing inputs, the researchers considered such factors as the energy used in producing the crop (including production of pesticides and fertilizer, running farm machinery and irrigating, grinding and transporting the crop) and in fermenting/distilling the ethanol from the water mix. Although additional costs are incurred, such as federal and state subsidies that are passed on to consumers and the costs associated with environmental pollution or degradation, these figures were not included in the analysis. "The United State desperately needs a liquid fuel replacement for oil in the near future," says Pimentel, "but producing ethanol or biodiesel from plant biomass is going down the wrong road, because you use more energy to produce these fuels than you get out from the combustion of these products." Although Pimentel advocates the use of burning biomass to produce thermal energy (to heat homes, for example), he deplores the use of biomass for liquid fuel. "The government spends more than $3 billion a year to subsidize ethanol production when it does not provide a net energy balance or gain, is not a renewable energy source or an economical fuel. Further, its production and use contribute to air, water and soil pollution and global warming," Pimentel says. He points out that the vast majority of the subsidies do not go to farmers but to large ethanol-producing corporations. "Ethanol production in the United States does not benefit the nation's energy security, its agriculture, economy or the environment," says Pimentel. "Ethanol production requires large fossil energy input, and therefore, it is contributing to oil and natural gas imports and U.S. deficits." He says the country should instead focus its efforts on producing electrical energy from photovoltaic cells, wind power and burning biomass and producing fuel from hydrogen conversion.

B. Violation – the AFF only increases incentives for the procurement of algae biofuels
C. Standards
1. Predictable limits – using energy outside the topic justifies using any fuel, exploding the topic. The AFF can claim advantages off of harnessing sulfur as a source of energy
2. Ground – the NEG loses specific links to proper alternatives to energy, crushing topic specific education
3. Research burden – the AFF chooses to lie outside the resolution, forcing the NEG to research all types of fuels
D. Voters for fairness, education and jurisdiction

Security K 1NC 1/5
Our fear of the “inevitable attack” on the US allows descisons to be made on lies and deception to instill fear into the public justifying our actions in the name of national security
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Our invasion of Iraq reflects the web of deception that the Bush administration, through its "war on terrorism," has woven around the events of that September morning. By all objective evidence Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, but as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested on the day after the attacks, the broad definition of that "war" would require us to invade Iraq. At that moment, Iraq rose to the surface from the deeper dreams and visions of our leaders— and so the moment became one of opportunity. To facilitate that policy our leaders then either made, or encouraged by innuendo, the false claim that Iraq was indeed implicated in 9/11, and by the time of the invasion about 50 percent of Americans had come to believe that falsehood. A deception on such a large scale could only occur because Americans remained genuinely fearful of terrorist attacks even more lethal than 9/11, and because that fear, that sense of vulnerability, could be manipulated to support larger and more ambitious policy aims. It became possible to redirect the fear from Osama bin Laden to another hated Middle Eastern figure, Saddam Hussein, to the point where the two became virtually interchangeable. If anything, American fear of another 9/11 has been intensified by the "successful" invasion and so remains available for use in other situations.

The paranoia of inevitable annihilation associated with superpower syndrome – legitimizes violence under the mask of “security”.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Inseparable from this grandiosity is the paranoid edge of the apocalyptic mindset. Leader and followers feel themselves constantly under attack—threatened not just with harm but with annihilation. For them that would mean the obliteration of everything of value on this degraded planet, of the future itself. They must destroy the world in order to survive themselves. This is why they in turn feel impelled to label as absolute evil and annihilate any group that seems to impede their own sacred mission. Such a sense of paranoid aggressiveness is more readily detectable in the case of certified zealots like Asahara or bin Laden. But it is by no means absent from the minds of American strategists who, though possessing overwhelming military dominance, express constant fear of national annihilation, and embark upon aggressive or "preemptive" military actions.

Security K 1NC 2/5
The insistence on the conventional, decisive conflicts of air power ignores the reality of modern asymmetric warfare. This re-entrenchs comfort in old ways of thought at the expense of military effectiveness.

Non-conventional, or asymmetric tactics are not new to the fair-fighting practitioners of Western warfare, but they have always been hated. The ancient Greeks, who preferred their fighting face-to-face, viewed those who fought from afar with universal disdain—skirmishers, javelin throwers, and above all, archers.5
The Greeks left an indelible stamp on Western society with their contributions to civics, law, and government. Their influence on modern warfare is equally striking—and in some eyes, disturbing. In The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece, Victor Davis Hanson explores this issue in detail. Although the Greek convention of limiting war strictly to combatant hoplites is not relevant today, the spirit of Hellenic warfare is alive and well in the minds of Western strategists.6 According to Hanson, although the Greeks eventually realized that pitched battle was not always the most efficient form of war, such fighting retained its usefulness by “providing a decisive (and glorious) conclusion.… The Greek’s stark way of battle left us with what is now a burdensome legacy in the West: a presumption that battle under any guise other than a no-nonsense head-to-head confrontation between sober enemies is or should be
The Clausewitzian quest for decisive battle and the “principles of war” taught
throughout the professional military education system, are direct descendants of Greek
culture. As taught by the U.S. military, the principles of war are essentially a cookbook
approach to corral any enemy into a position where American firepower can be brought
to bear so we can destroy him, return to the normal state of peace, and go home.
These principles assume that battlefield victory is relevant in itself, making few
allowances for an enemy who practices a “live to fight another day” strategy, and,
through sheer obstinacy and will, survives. For many in the U.S. military, the disturbing
legacy of the Vietnam War is not that we failed to recognize the true non-Western nature
of the conflict, but rather that politicians prohibited warfighters from fully applying the
principles of war to our enemy.8
In many ways, Americans continue to view limited war as the British did a
century ago when taming the African colonies. As John Ellis writes in The Social
History of the Machine Gun, “Regular soldiers who went overseas…regarded the
Africans as weird eccentrics, hardly even human beings, they would look on colonial
warfare as an amusing diversion with little in common with real war.”9 Technology (in
the form of the Maxim gun) was a godsend for these good citizens of the world: “In
ancient times…civilized communities could hardly defend themselves against poor and
barbarous races…. In our day it is the poor and barbarous tribes who are everywhere at
the mercy of the wealthy and cultivated nations.10

Security K 1NC 3/5
Certainly, the British took their sense of fair play to any war they waged, and this too has firm roots in the U.S. military. While superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the following verse inscribed on the portal of the school gymnasium:
Upon the fields of friendly strife
are sown the seeds
that, upon other fields, on other days
will bear the fruits of victory.11
Teamwork, camaraderie, and esprit de corps have a definite place in any conflict, but also implicit in the quatrain is the concept of sportsmanship. One of the primary reasons Americans disdain guerillas, terrorists, and irregulars is that they do not “fight fair.” Time and again, the “dirty” tactics of these groups surprises the American military, yet little is learned from the experience.12 When the next conflict arises, Americans assume that the Marquis of Queensbury Rules are back in effect.
With the inertia of 2,500 years of Western culture behind it, there is little wonder the U.S. military is frequently shocked when war differs from Western expectations. While airpower advocates view their tool as revolutionary, they have actually done little more than secure a niche in the conventional Western way of waging war. Like the Greeks, air strategists yearn for decisiveness. Towards that end, the United States has invested in generation after generation of the finest technology available to find, fix, target, track, and destroy our enemies. But when confronted with the skirmishers, javelin throwers, and archers of the 20th Century, airpower has been far less than decisive.
As this century closes, many pundits speculate that with the advent of nuclear weapons and global interdependence, Western-style war has become extinct. But as Victor Davis Hanson warns, “The legacy of the Greeks’ battle style lingers on, a narcotic that we cannot put away.”13 The future of warfare cannot be seen in the hulks of Iraqi tanks, rather it can be found lurking in Haitian slums, Albanian villages, and Islamic pressure-cookers. In the next century, air strategists will continue to search for decisive results, but they may find greater success if they depend more on the advice of psychologists, sociologists, and linguists, and less on targeteers and technologists.

Security K 1NC 4/5
America’s obsession with trying to prevent and stop conflict – fueled by the fear of vulnerability and the unknown legitimizes violent acts to take place in the name of security eventually leading to inevitable extinction.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are energized by versions of intense idealism; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American "infidels." Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I've come to think of as "superpower syndrome." By that term I mean a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate; the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world's only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower’s victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are never absent in any part of the world. -- The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy.

Security K 1NC 5/5
The Alternative is to vote negative – the text is to begin our interrogations of security by refusing the affirmative’s quest for stability.
Accepting and living with ambiguity and vulnerability is key to preventing violence.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.

States CP 1NC
Text: The state and federal territorial governments should fund private companies that provide the air force with alternative energy technlogy including algae biomass

Observation 1: competition

The counterplan is non-topical and competes through net-benefits.
Observation 2: solvency
Private companies provide the most innovated technology for the military
ISN, 7/28/2008, For sale: High-tech, lethal weapons < sw/details.cfm?ID=19239>
"Unlike US companies, British companies do not want to be seen as private military companies as this might scare away potential corporate clients. On the contrary, the larger US companies consider themselves as something like force multipliers of US grand strategy: Their services are aimed at bolstering US operations overseas," Dr Sabrina Schulz, a London-based consultant and expert on the UK private security industry, told ISN Security Watch.
"In the US, the private sector has become not only a 'tolerated' or 'accepted' part of US defense policy - its role is increasing because the US desires and welcomes private sector involvement." While large defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman usually receive the vast majority of their annual earnings from government contracts, some private military and security companies are now marketing and advertising unique products to both government and nongovernmental clients. "Larger US companies can rely on government contracts for 90, if not more, percent of their business - only about 10 percent are generated through contracts with other businesses. In the UK, this ratio is the reverse. UK companies cater mostly for other private companies, amounting to roughly 90 percent of their turnover," Shulz told ISN Security Watch. From a 6-meter armored tank to a 32-centimeter pepper-spraying flashlight, the two largest military and security industries are able to meet the needs of almost any customer. But as with any maturing industry, so comes competition. Another firm, Canada-based SkyLink Security makes no hesitation in advertising its hi-tech products for identity screening, explosive and weapons detection and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) surveillance. SkyLink describes itself as a "one-stop shop of Homeland Security services for both government and civilian customers."The company offers the BioFinger, a "single chip that can read a fingerprint from a live finger or printed image and verify [its] authenticity." The chip also identifies pulse waves in the finger, registering "information about heart rate, blood pressure, blood consistency, vascular and nervous system status of any given person." SkyLink also features VibraLie, an image scanning system that records vibrations of the human face, making the product the world's "first-ever contact-less passenger screening technology." Another private military company, the Golan Group, was founded in 1983 by ex-Israeli Special Forces personnel. The company provides a range of specialized military and security solutions, among which include executive protection, maritime security and facilities security, security training, business and civil intelligence gathering and crisis management. Golan Group is headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida, operates throughout Israel and is present in over 20 countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The company offers an amazingly unique product called the __CornerShot__ Weapon System. As the name suggests, the system allows the attachment of most handguns used by US, UK and Israeli Special Forces for the ability to aim and fire around corners, thereby shielding the user from oncoming fire.The system uses a series of lights and lasers which transmit images to a small video screen built just in front of the trigger device, allowing soldiers or law enforcement personnel the ability to view and aim at targets completely out of the line of sight. Costing upwards of US$5,000, the CornerShot eventually became so popular that the company manufactured two other product lines of the system, one to fit 40mm grenade and tear gas launchers and another to fit small-scale assault rifles. These types of weapons began to emerge in the marketplace as combat operations transitioned into urban environments in which the strategic atmosphere has become multi-dimensional and angular. The Golan Group markets the weapons system as a necessary tool in such combat.

Azerbaijan DA 1NC 1/3
A. Azerbaijan’s economy is set to maintain stability—oil boom fuels growth
Tom Krisher, International Business Times, 2-13-07, articles/20070213/azerbaijan- economy.htm
BAKU, Azerbaijan (AP) - Azerbaijan's economy will maintain last year's 35-percent growth rate in 2007, driven by the ex-Soviet nation's oil boom, the president said Tuesday. Oil revenues had allowed the government to create 520,000 new jobs in the nation of 8 million over the last three years and reduce poverty, Ilham Aliev said. "Oil riches have been justly divided between the nation's citizens," he said at an economic conference. "Our oil strategy has been successful because all people have received dividends." Azerbaijan's political opposition has accused Aliev's government of failing to justly distribute the nation's oil wealth and solve the problem of poverty. Aliev succeeded his father, Geidar, a former KGB general who had been in power for a decade, in a 2003 election that was criticized by foreign observers and dismissed as fraudulent by the opposition. Aliev said the country's economy grew by 26 percent in 2005, by 35 percent last year and is expected to maintain last year's growth rate this year. The quick growth has allowed increased budget spending which is set to reach the equivalent of US$6.5 billion this year compared to US$1.4 billion in 2003, Aliev said. The United States backed a 1,760-kilometer (1,100-mile) pipeline delivering oil from offshore oil fields in Azerbaijan to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan for export to the West, bypassing Russia and Iran. A gas line is in the works, and Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan also signed a deal earlier this month to build a railroad line that will provide a new route for trade between the three nations. Aliev hailed the new railroad link, saying it will strengthen Azerbaijan's role as a transit nation.
B. Drop in oil prices kills Azerbaijan’s government revenue and economy
Svetlana Tsalik, director, Caspian Revenue Watch, Central Eurasia Project,
Open Society Institute, 2003 “Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will benefit?” http://archive.revenuewatch. org/reports/051203.pdf
As a result of the growth of oil production and exports, and a relatively high price for oil, the budget of Azerbaijan has become highly dependent on oil for its revenues. In 2001, the oil sector contributed 29.6 percent of budget revenues. In 2003, oil sector revenues will comprise 32 percent of the government’s budget, according to the parliamentary committee on economic policy.40 Once the oil-related construction and service industries are taken into account, the impact is even larger. As noted elsewhere, the large share that oil plays in government revenues has dangerous consequences in the event of a downturn in the price of oil. According to IMF estimates, each $1 drop in the price of oil translates to a loss of $35 million in government revenue, or approximately 5 percent of total government revenues in the year 2000.41 The impact on the budget will be even greater as production ramps up in the next few years. This risk is aggravated by the absence of a budget stabilization mechanism in the country’s oil fund, as will be discussed below. Since their inception, oil bonuses have been used every year to finance the government’s budget deficit.42 Between 1995 and 2000, oil bonuses financed, on average, 62 percent of budget deficits and, in one year, 90 percent of the budget deficit. In total, $345 million in bonuses have already been spent for this purpose.

Azerbaijan DA 1NC 2/3
C. Azerbaijan’s economy is key to the global economy and security
Daniel S. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 5-16-07, __ rls/rm/2007/91369.htm__
Great to be back in Azerbaijan. Each time I visit Baku I feel the energy of a changing, growing and modernizing economy. I can actually see changes that have taken place since my last visit in February – new roads, bridges and buildings all around the city. Clearly Baku is taking its place as a key regional economic hub. The Azerbaijani economy is taking off, and the country’s oil and gas revenues have the potential to transform the country and the lives of the people here. The United States has deep and long-term interests in the Caspian region. We are committed particularly to helping ensure Azerbaijan’s prosperity, independence, and sovereignty. And we fully support President Aliyev’s commitment to making Azerbaijan a modern, secular, democratic, and market-oriented state. Azerbaijan’s key role in global energy security, our important cooperation on regional security, and the country’s strategic position as the natural gateway between Europe and Central Asia make it an essential partner for the United States. Over the past year, due in large part to the intensive efforts of our Ambassador and your officials, we have intensified our engagement with Azerbaijan across three critical areas: 1) democracy and democratic reform; 2) security cooperation; and 3) energy cooperation and economic reform. Now, my Bureau, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, I focus on the third area – energy and economic cooperation, but we it’s important to recognize that all three of these areas are absolutely very interconnected. We look for progress in all three because progress in each of these three areas reinforces progress in the others and we believe that these three areas moving forward will lead to lasting security, stability, and prosperity that all citizens desire and deserve. Energy Cooperation So let me first talk about the critical area of energy cooperation between our two countries. We have a well-established history of cooperation and trust in the field of energy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline – which as you know, is one of the most modern, state of the art pipelines in the world – is a symbol and testament to that critical cooperation. Azerbaijan’s regional leadership was essential to bringing the BTC vision to reality. We are building on this tradition of close cooperation in the energy field. This past March, my boss at the State Department Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov signed a memorandum of understanding formally establishing the U.S.-Azerbaijan Energy Dialogue. I co-chair this Dialogue and we had very constructive meetings to further advance our common energy security goals in this area. What are these goals? Well, as we announced today, during the signing of a U.S. Trade and Development Agency grant that will go to SOCAR. We believe we are now embarked on the next stage of Caspian Energy development, which would entail a number of things: 1) enhanced production of oil and gas in Azerbaijan’s offshore sector; 2) continued natural gas exports to Georgia and Turkey, and initial exports to Greece and Italy; 3) further work on the Nabucco pipeline project, with Azerbaijan’s and perhaps Central Asia’s gas moving to markets in Central Europe, and 4) the emergence of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas transit country, as Azerbaijan continues its outreach to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan’s continued leadership will be essential to achieve these goals, as we continue cooperation between the U.S. and Azerbaijan, as well as working to deepen the cooperation between Azerbaijan and our European allies and the European Commission. The commencement of the next phase of Caspian energy development, we believe has already begun. As I mentioned, today we signed a rather large feasibility study to construct an oil and gas pipeline connecting Central Asia to Azerbaijan. This is a big and important step and it is the beginning of many good things to come in terms of the next phase of Caspian energy development. We believe the opportunities in this sector are great and can lead to lasting opportunity for the people of the region. Now is the time to seize these opportunities. U.S.-Azerbaijan EPC The next thing I wanted to talk about was the Economic Partnership Commission that we launched in February. We are seeking to support economic stability and prosperity in Azerbaijan through our work on the U.S.-Azerbaijan EPC – as we call it – which I launched with Minister Sharifov in February of this year. Again, we met today and reviewed goals, reviewed progress, and took stock of what we’ve been doing. We’ve made a of the EPC are to strengthen and deepen economic and commercial engagement between our two countries and ensure Azerbaijan’s continued, sustainable development, wise use of its energy resources and revenues, and successful transition toward a market economy. A healthy empowered private sector is key to broad and sustained economic growth. I am in Azerbaijan to take stock of the EPC progress we have made and to help set future goals under the EPC

Azerbaijan DA 1NC 3/3
D. Economic decline causes a nuclear war
Mead, 1992( Walter Russell, NPQ’S Board of advisors, New perspectives quarterly, summer 1992, page 30 )
Hundreds of millions - billions - of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have
embraced market principles -- and drawn closer to the west – because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - These countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.

NMD DA 1NC 1/3
U.S. talks over NMD now—increasing Polish security is key to acceptance
ChinaView, March 08 english/2008-03/13/content_ 7780787.htm [JWu]
A day after Tusk's meeting with Bush at the White House, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich said Tuesday that the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland would depend on the country's security situation despite pledges by Washington to upgrade its military. The minister said the Polish government is assessing whether the promised U.S. military aid can offset a possible security threat to Poland brought about by the deployment of the missile shield. Klich said if Poland's national security should be undermined as a result of the scheme, the government will by no means ink a deal with the United States on the issue. Out of security concerns, Poland has asked the U.S. to provide Patriot 3 or THAAD missiles and listed 17 areas of its military that the U.S. could help modernize. Poland has also asked for military aid worth several billion U.S. dollars. Poland also wants to forge closer ties with the U.S., demanding a bilateral relationship similar to the one between the U.S. and Britain. The Polish government's desire for such a hard bargain with the United States is also a response to the concerns of the Polish people.

CAMILLE GRAND, Institut français des Relations internationales (IFRI), Paris. Lecturer, Institut d’études politiques de Paris, and Ecole spéciale militaire, and Adviser for arms control and non-proliferation at the French Ministry of Defense. 01 "NMD and arms control: a European view." landnet/NMD/grand.pdf [JWu]
Analysts opposing NMD and European leaders have written numerous pieces, and made numerous statements demonstrating a genuine concern that, if mishandled, NMD could or would jeopardize 30 years of arms control efforts. French President Jacques Chirac stated that NMD is “of a nature to retrigger a proliferation of weapons, notably nuclear missiles.”3 German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder expressed a similar view when he said, “Neither economically, nor politically, can we afford a new round of the arms race.”4 According to these views, the worst-case arms control scenario is that NMD deployment by the US will be followed by Russia’s withdrawal from major arms treaties and verification regimes (the INF Treaty, the tactical nuclear regime of 1991, START), as well as its development of greater offensive and defensive capabilities. China would also block further arms control efforts and increase the expansion of its nuclear forces, followed by India and Pakistan. Additionally, Russia and China could loosen their already weak export controls and deliberately accelerate missile and WMD technology proliferation. “States of concern” could engage in a missile buildup to try to challenge the emerging NMD and local TMD programs. This would lead to a renewed interest and potential arms race among the major powers in more modern offensive capabilities and counteroptions including space-based weapons. Many would therefore share the view expressed at the 2000 NPT review conference by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh that NMD “could run counter to efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

NMD DA 1NC 2/3
Vladimir Volkov International Editorial Board member of WSWS 18 July 2008 2008/jul2008/miss-j18.shtml [JWU]
The US and the Czech Republic signed an agreement July 8 in Prague for the deployment of radar and anti-missile systems on the territory of this Eastern European country. The pact has become one more step in sharpening geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia. It evoked a stormy response from Moscow.
Signed by American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg, the agreement is opposed by about 70 percent of Czech citizens. Its defenders justify the agreement by pointing to the need to defend Europe from possible Iranian missile attacks. However, the Russian side insists that the true target of creating an infrastructure of anti-missile defense in Eastern Europe is not Iran, but Russia. If the plan is realized, then the military and political positions of Russia would be weakened.
A statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on the next day said that “the Russian side in such a situation will take adequate measures to compensate for potential threats to its national security.” This statement referred not to “diplomatic, but military-technological methods.”
Speaking on July 15 in the Kremlin at a meeting with representatives of the diplomatic corps, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said: “Placing elements of a global anti-missile system by the US in Eastern Europe only deepens the situation, and we will be forced to react to this adequately.”
He declared that Russia’s national security could not be maintained simply by the good word of its partners, and he accused Washington of “gradually undermining... the strategic stability in relations between our countries.”

Helen Caldicott, founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, 2002, “The New Nuclear Danger”, p. 7-12. [T-Jacob]

If launched from Russia, nuclear weapons would explode over American cities thirty minutes after takeoff. (China's twenty missiles are liquidfueled, not solid-fueled. They take many hours to fuel and could not be used in a surprise attack, but they would produce similar damage if launched. Other nuclear-armed nations, such as India and Pakistan, do not have the missile technology to attack the U.S.) It is assumed that most cities with a population over 100,000 people are targeted by Russia. During these thirty minutes, the U.S. early-warning infrared satellite detectors signal the attack to the strategic air command in Colorado. They in turn notify the president, who has approximately three minutes to decide whether or not to launch a counterattack. In the counterforce scenario the US. government currently embraces, he does [the U.S.] launch[es], the missiles pass mid-space, and the whole operation is over within one hour. Landing at 20 times the speed of sound, nuclear weapons explode over cities, with heat equal to that inside the center of the sun. There is practically no warning, except the emergency broadcast system on radio or TV, which gives the public only minutes to reach the nearest fallout shelter, assuming there is one. There is no time to collect children or immediate family members. The bomb, or bombs-because most major cities will be hit with more than one explosion-will gouge out craters 200 feet deep and 1000 feet in diameter if they explode at ground level. Most, however, are programmed to produce an air burst, which increases the diameter of destruction, but creates a shallower crater. Half a mile from the epicenter all buildings will be destroyed, and at 1.7 miles only reinforced concrete buildings will remain. At 2.7 miles bare skeletons of buildings still stand, single-family residences have disappeared, 50 percent are dead and 40 percent severely injured.' Bricks and mortar are converted to missiles traveling at hundreds of miles an hour. Bodies have been sucked out of buildings and converted to missiles themselves, flying through the air at loo miles per hour. Severe overpressures (pressure many times greater than normal atmospheric have popcorned windows, producing millions of shards of flying glass, causing decapitations and shocking lacerations. Overpressures have also entered the nose, mouth, and ears, inducing rupture of lungs and rupture of the tympanic membranes or eardrums. Most people will suffer severe burns. In Hiroshima, which was devastated by a very small bomb-13 kilotons compared to the current iooo kilotons-a child actually disappeared, vaporized, leaving his shadow on the concrete pavement behind him. A mother was running, holding her baby, and both she and the baby were converted to a charcoal statue. The heat will be so intense that dry objects-furniture, clothes, and dry wood-will spontaneously ignite. Humans will become walking, flaming torches. Forty or fifty miles from the explosion people will instantly be blinded from retinal burns if they glance at the flash. Huge firestorms will engulf thousands of square miles, fanned by winds from the explosion that transiently exceed 1000 miles per hour. People in fallout shelters will be asphyxiated as fire sucks oxygen from the shelters. (This happened in Hamburg after the Allied bombing in WWII when temperatures within the shelters, caused by conventional bombs, reached 1472 degrees Fahrenheit.)" Most of the city and its people will be converted to radioactive dust shot up in the mushroom cloud. The area of lethal fallout from this cloud will depend upon the prevailing wind and weather conditions; it could cover thousands

NMD DA 1NC 3/3
of square miles. Doses of 5000 rads (a rad is a measure of radiation dose) or more experienced by people close to the explosion-if they are still aliv-will produce acute encephalopathic syndrome. The cells of the brain will become so damaged that they would swell. Because the brain is enclosed in a fixed bony space, there is no room for swelling, so the pressure inside the skull rises, inducing symptoms of excitability, acute nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, severe headache, and seizures, followed by coma and death within twenty-four hours. A lower dose of 1000 rads causes death from gastrointestinal symptoms. The lining cells of the gut die, as do the cells in the bone marrow that fight infection and that cause blood clotting. Mouth ulcers, loss of appetite, severe colicky abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea occur within seven to fourteen days. Death follows severe fluid loss, infection, hemorrhage, and starvation. At 450 rads, 50 percent of the population dies. Hair drops out, vomiting and bloody diarrhea occurs, accompanied by bleeding under the skin and from the gums. Death occurs from internal hemorrhage, generalized septicemia, and infection. Severe trauma and injuries exacerbate the fallout symptoms, so patients die more readily from lower doses of radiation. Infants, children, and old people are more sensitive to radiation than healthy adults. Within bombed areas, fatalities will occur from a combination of trauma, burns, radiation sickness, and starvation. There will be virtually no medical care, even for the relief of pain, because most physicians work within The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous radioactive facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton bomb (1 megaton) landing on a standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would permanently contaminate an .' area the size of western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human and animal alike-will rot, infected with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal. Trillions of insects, naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the living, to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation. Rodents will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases now controlled by immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping cough, diphtheria, smallpox, plague,tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decayssufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated that perhaps older people should be sent outside to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to developmalignancies from the fallout (cancer and leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that manages to grow will be toxic because plants concentrate radioactive elements.*/ Finally, we must examine the systemic global effects of a nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a blanket of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will be required for light and temperature to return to normal per-"r haps supernormal values, as sunlight would return to more than its , , usual intensity, enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. Sub freezing temperatures could destroy the biological support system for civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "the total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this vulnerability is an aspect not currentlya part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposedSTART I11 treaty between Russia and America, even if it were implemented, would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on alert."he threshold for nuclear winter? One thousand loo-kiloton bombsblowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given current capabilities and targeting plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected signals from an American missile that hadjust been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US. submarines could launcha missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian officials assumed that America had initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer containing nuclearlaunch codes was opened. President Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a threeminute interval to make a decision. At the last moment, the US.missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If Russia had launched its missiles, the US. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to Cheyenne Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make his launch decision, and America's missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within minutes of global annihilation that day. ,' Today, Russia's early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating. Russia's early-warning system fails to operate up to seven hours a day because only one-third of its radars are functional, and two of the nine global geographical areas covered by its missilewarning satellites are not under surveillance for missile detection.9 TO make matters worse, the equipment controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic devices and computers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According to the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely disrupted when robbers tried to "mine" critical communications cables for their copper!'" This vulnerable Russian system could easily be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, when the danger of accidental or indeed intentional nuclear war would become very real. And the U.S. itself is not invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new computer system to deal with potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency "blind" for days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part of America's nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a year." (At that time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches. Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such a situation has the potential for catastrophe. If America cannot observe what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons-or vice versa-especially during a serious international crisis they are likely to err on the side of "caution," which could mean that something as benign as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet.This situation became even more significant after the September 11 attack.

Air Power Case 1/5
Dary G. Press, Assist Prof Gov Dept, Rsrch Flw @ Rockefeller, Assoc. John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001, "the myth of air power in the persian gulf war and the future of warfare" International Security Vol 26 No 2, President andFellows of HarvardCollege andthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [JWu]
My interpretation of the Gulf War, in contrast, paints a more complicated picture of the emerging relationship between air and groundforces. Air power failedto neutralize the Iraqi groundfor ces because destroying a largely static, defensive force from the air is inherently difficult, even in the era of information- age intelligence andpr ecision-strike weapons. The lesson of the Gulf War is not that air power is a weak instrument of national military power, but that the capabilities of air power against mechanizedgr oundfor ces on the offensive are substantially greater than air power’s capabilities against defensive forces. The implication of my analysis for U.S. foreign policy is that air power may play a decisive role in future U.S. operations to halt an enemy’s mechanizedassault on a U.S. ally. It will not likely be decisive, however, if the United States or its allies needto conduct an offensive to take enemy-controlledterritory. For example, if North Korea attacks South Korea, or if Iraq invades Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, U.S. air assets may play a leading role in the destruction of the invading forces. But if the U.S. objective in these contingencies is to launch a counteroffensive into North Korea, or to once again evict Iraq from Kuwait, air power will be far less effective against defensively orientedNorth Korean, or Iraqi, forces. The force structure implications of this analysis are straightforward: If the United States envisions launching offensive operations to defeat its enemies, it will still require a balanced military that includes substantial heavy ground forces. Overemphasizing air assets may prove
very costly.9

All the speed and reach don't matter if you can't locate a defensive enemy—air power is counterproductive in middle east and Korean conflicts
Dary G. Press, Assist Prof Gov Dept, Rsrch Flw @ Rockefeller, Assoc. John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001, "the myth of air power in the persian gulf war and the future of warfare" International Security Vol 26 No 2, President andFellows of HarvardCollege andthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [JWu]
Historians, military analysts, and policymakers have drawn the wrong lessons from the Gulf War, and this may have serious implications for U.S. foreign policy and U.S. force structure. Air power is now significantly more lethal against ground tar gets than it was before. Almost any target that is detected and identified can be destroyed from the air with precision munitions.96 But air power still has limited effectiveness against defensively orientedenemy ground forces. Locating enemy ground forces in the desert is maddeningly difficult; in forest or mountainous terrain, or in urban areas, it is even harder. And distinguishing real targets from decoys frustrated the United States in both the Gulf War andKosovo. There are many contingencies in which the UnitedStates or its allies may need to destroy a defensively oriented enemy ground force. A U.S.–South Korean counterattack into North Korea; a U.S.-ledcounter offensive into Iraq; a U.S. invasion of Kosovo, Montenegro, or Serbia; or an Israeli offensive to retake the Golan Heights or southern Lebanon wouldpr obably all require overcoming defensively orientedenemy groundfor ces. In all of these cases, air power wouldpr obably have only limitedef fects on enemy defenses; success wouldhinge on the effectiveness of groundfor ces.

Air Power Case 2/5
Turn—focusing on airpower neglects ground military, which is key for ground battles
Dary G. Press, Assist Prof Gov Dept, Rsrch Flw @ Rockefeller, Assoc. John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001, "the myth of air power in the persian gulf war and the future of warfare" International Security Vol 26 No 2, President andFellows of HarvardCollege andthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [JWu]
At least two policy implications follow from this analysis. First, the United States andits allies shouldnot overestimate the effectiveness of air attacks and undertake offensive military operations with the expectation that air power will provide a cheap victory. When enemy ground forces must be ejected from the territory they occupy, success or failure will be determined on the ground, andthe price will dependon the ability of U.S. andalliedgr oundfor ces to overmatch the enemy. Second, the geography andfor eign policy of the UnitedStates require that it maintain a balancedmilitary force structure. Because the UnitedStates has global military commitments, it must have a military that can deploy rapidly to defend faraway allies. Air power is ideal for this mission: It can get to distant battlefields quickly and—as al-Khafji and the Highway of Death show—it can be lethal against enemy groundfor ces on the move. However, because its allies are far away, the UnitedStates often joins wars late. Alliedterritory often must be recaptured, and sometimes enemy territory must be taken. For these missions, the UnitedStates needs groundfor ces that can dominate the battle field. Unless the United States military maintains large, well-trained, and well-armedgr oundfor ces, it will not be preparedto achieve more one-sided victories like the Gulf War.

Air Power Case 3/5
The cumulative toll which direct and indirect propaganda actions exacted on the U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War were increasingly debilitating to airpower. By 1972, when the “Christmas bombings”—massive B-52 strikes centered on targets in and around Hanoi—were ordered to force North Vietnam back to the Paris Peace Talks, “the U.S. government was so concerned about the political fallout resulting from even moderate civilian casualties that some of the more lucrative military targets of the Linebacker II campaign were dropped from the target list rather than inflict civilian casualties.”41
Although the theory of strategic bombing can trace its roots to many countries, the United States has become virtually the sole practitioner in the post-World War II world. With the emergence of airpower as an almost unique instrument of power separate from more traditional military means, this tendency will undoubtedly increase.

Propaganda has a proven track record against U.S. airpower; accordingly, the United States is sensitive to where bombs are dropped and when. The December 1998 halt of Operation Desert Fox air strikes prior to the beginning of Ramadan is only the most recent example. Painfully aware that Iraq would capitalize on the image of Western bombs falling on Muslims during this holy month, General Zinni was on a tight schedule to hit targets before Ramadan began. With only four days allotted to severely degrade Iraqi capability, U.S. Central Command was presented with an almost undoable mission.
Had the attacks continued, the Iraqis would have undoubtedly omitted from their outraged press releases the Koranic loophole which permits Ramadan to be ignored in war.32 Indeed, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War—initiated by the Arabs--and known in the West as the “Yom Kippur War,” is called the “Ramadan War” in the Muslim world. The United States’ sensitivity to anti-American propaganda can result in changing viable strategies in order to preemptively defuse enemy propaganda opportunities. U.S. airpower can be the best trained, organized, and equipped force in the world, with a flawless war plan to match, and never be allowed to get in the fight—or handcuffed so severely that airpower is reduced in ineffectiveness.

Air Power Case 4/5

This combined arms strategy can begin well before U.S. airpower arrives in theater. While every conflict is unique, post-World War II history reveals some predictable political patterns among technologically weaker adversaries, regardless of their location or cause. In descending order, our foes will attempt to deter U.S. involvement, encourage us to discontinue intervention, and finally wear out U.S. resolve and interest if we do become involved.
U.S. involvement in a limited war is never a given. Somalia and Kosovo do not deliver images of threatened vital interests to most Americans. Among the citizenry, support for limited wars requires a governmental appeal. There are many ways that an enemy can interfere with this process. At the political level, skillful use of the media routinely chips away at America’s credibility, while the successful destruction of coalitions can result in a greatly weakened American presence, regardless of our motivation. Operational and tactical events can take on political meaning as well; in the wake of the Al Firdos bunker strike, note the effect that two legally dropped bombs had on the nature of Desert Storm’s air campaign.

Air Power Case 5/5
Air strikes generate more insurgents than they kill
Carlotta Gall and David Sanger, International Herald Tribune, May 13, 2007

"There is absolutely no question that the will and support of the Afghan people is vitally important to what we do here," said General Dan McNeill, the American commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force, in an interview. "We are their guests, they are the hosts. We have to be mindful of their culture, we have to operate in the context of their culture and we have to take every possible precaution to not cause undue risk to those around us, and to their property."
But U.S. officials say that they have been forced to use air power more intensively as they have spread their reach throughout Afghanistan, raiding Taliban strongholds that have gone untouched for six years. One senior NATO official said that "without air, we'd need hundreds of thousands of troops" in the country. They also contend that the key to reducing casualties is training more Afghan Army soldiers and police officers.
The anger is visible in Zerkoh, a farming village in the largely peaceful western Afghan province of Herat, where U.S. airstrikes left 57 villagers dead, nearly half of them women and children, on April 27 and 29.
The accounts of villagers bore little resemblance to those of NATO officials - and suggested just how badly things could go astray in an unfamiliar land where cultural misunderstandings quickly turn violent.
The U.S. military says it came under heavy fire from insurgents as troops searched for a local tribal commander and weapons caches. The troops called in airstrikes, killing 136 Taliban fighters, the U.S. military said.
The villagers say there were never any Taliban in the area. Instead, they said, they rose up and fought the Americans after the soldiers raided several houses, arrested two men and shot and killed two old men on a village road.
After burying the dead, the tribe's elders met with their chief, Hajji Arbab Daulat Khan, and resolved to fight U.S. forces if they returned.
"If they come again, we will stand against them, and we will raise the whole area against them," he warned.
In the words of one foreign official in Afghanistan, the Americans went after one guerrilla commander and created a hundred more.