Topicality – alternative energy
Alternative energy excludes nuclear and fossil fuels
Judge William Bertinelli, Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, 1987, 195 Cal. App. 3d 982; 241 Cal. Rptr. 215; 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 2255, 10/28, lexis)
17 Public Resources Code section 26003, subdivision (d), defines alternative energy sources as including geothermal sources of energy and any other source of energy, "the efficient use of which will reduce the use of fossil and nuclear fuels."
B. Violation – the AFF advocates nuclear energy as an alternative energy resource.
C. Standards:
1. predictable Limits: allowing the AFF to develop any source of energy explodes the topic – there are different energies they can choose from, this allows them to claim big advantages off of extremely tiny mechanisms and isn’t predictable.
2. Ground: predictable, core negative ground is based on ALTERNATIVE ENERGY – WE CAN’T RUN ENERGY SPECIFIC D/A’s, kritiks, cp’s, or case args.
3. education: we can’t learn about alternative energies or the mechanism in which they are implemented.
D. Voters for fairness, education, and jurisdiction.

Prolif K 1NC Shell 1/4
The affirmative adopts a biological metaphor of proliferation that frames proliferation as the outward spread of weapons – externally controlling is the ultimate embrace of the metaphor – adherence constructs proliferation as a technological and autonomous problem, diverting attention from human agency and social facts
David Mutimer 1994 (Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation, August 1994,)[E.Berggren]
The proliferation metaphor as applied to nuclear weapons. The first entailment is the image of a spread outward from a point, or source. Cell division begins with a single, or source cell, and spreads outward from there — in the case of a cancer, both to produce a single tumour and to create a number of separate tumours throughout the host body. Similarly, the 'problem' of proliferation is one of a source or sources 'proliferating', that is reproducing itself by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of technological application. This image highlights the transmission process from source to recipient, and entails policy designed to cut off the supply, restricting the
technology to its source. Hence, the dominant response to nuclear proliferation is the creation of supplier groups, the Zangger Committee and the NSG, which seeks to 'control' the spread of nuclear technology. In other words, they attempt to provide "the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly" transfer, and prevent the spread of nuclear technology resulting in the "cancer" of weapons' proliferation. The image is repeated even in the more extreme proposals for policy. For example, former Prime Minster Trudeau proposed a scheme to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament for preventing weapons' spread. This scheme included two measures currently under consideration at the Conference on Disarmament, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Cutoff of Fissile Material Production. Trudeau's plan was known as the 'suffocation proposal'—firmly in keeping with the biological referent of proliferation. To stop, rather than control, reproduction by organisms, you need to 'suffocate' the progenitors. The second entailment of the 'proliferation' metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons
spread is an extreme technological bias. Biological proliferation is an internally driven phenomenon, and so the image of 'Proliferation' applied to the development of nuclear technology highlights the autonomous spread of that technology, and its problematic weapons variant. As Frank Barnaby writes in a recent work, "A country with a nuclear power programme will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons."50 In fact, the text from which this is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the 'proliferation' metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-weapon proliferation in the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread, they are not spread by an external agent of some form—say a human being or human institution. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed, for as Lakoff and Johnson argue, the metaphors are so deeply engrained in our conceptual system that they are not recognised as being metaphorical. This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread, but are spread—and in fact are spread largely by the western states. Secondly, the image downplays, to the point of hiding, any of the political, social, economic and structural factors which tend to driv states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalising the 'security dilemma' to the point that it is considered as an automatic dynamic. The image of PROLIFERATION thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy, by casting the problem as a technical, apolitical one. The Non-Proliferation Treaty controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the supply—that is the outward flow—of this same technology. The goal, in both cases, is to stem or, at least slow, the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques. Such a policy is almost doomed to fail, however, for it downplays and hides the very
concerns which motivate the agents of the process. Iraq was driven to acquire nuclear weapons, even in the face of NPT commitments, and so employed technology which is considered so outdated that it is no longer tightly controlled. This simply does not fit with the NPT-NSG-Zangger Committee approach. In addition, in order to gain the necessary material, the Iraqis needed access to external technology. Such technology was acquired by
human agents acting for the Iraqi state and was acquired from other agents, who had their own motivationa interests to provide the necessary technology. The technology does not 'spread' through some autonomous process akin to that causing a zygote to become a person, but rather they are spread, and so the agents involved are able to sidestep the technologically focussed control efforts. The second step of this process, reimagining international security in the terms of PROLIFERATION following the end of the Cold War, adopts the policy entailments along
with the underlying biological imagery. By using the PROLIFERATION image now to address biological and chemical weapons, missile technology and even conventional weapons, the international community is replicating the problematic policy solutions which highlight technology and hide politics and agency. Thus the NPT and its supplier groups are joined by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, a supplier group
which also oversees export controls on both chemical and biological weapons' technology. Missile technology is controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even conventional arms, the ones we might expect to be most closely related to understandings of politics, are conceived in terms of 'excessive and destabilising accumulations'. Once more, it is the weapons themselves, rather than the political agents acquiring and using them,
which are the lexical focus of discussions of conventional arms. What is ignored by this policy approach is any suggestion that there are political interests or motivations at work, which may cause human institutions to act in ways which promote insecurity (which, in other words, destabilize). A good part of the reason for this lack of understanding is that the image of the problem is one which downplays, and even hides, the involvement of the
politics of human agency in both the acts of supply and acquisition.
The discourse of nuclear proliferation is represented so that “theirs” is dangerous – but ours is not – this is just the American fantasy to demonize the other
Hugh Gusterson 1999, (Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, 14:1)[E.Berggren]
Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs"
are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse
on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way
as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical"
proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved
weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the
"horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting
only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold
War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons
on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals
from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers
to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article
6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration
has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United
States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton
administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically
formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter ch
emical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).

Prolif K 1NC Shell 2/4
Proliferation in the Third World is seen as irrational acts of passion which must be controlled by the strong hand of the US.
Hugh Gusterson 1999, (Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, 14:1)[E.Berggren]
Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms
of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual,
has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with
male human rationality (Haraway 1990; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus
certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast
proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery that carries a subtle feminine
or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having "vital
interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World nations have "passions,"
"longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be controlled and
contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an evident
ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Times editorial (1987a:A34). Peter
Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot
forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings" (1987:A27). Representative Ed
Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington
Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that
the Pakistanis "can feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military
aid from America" (1987:A22). The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging
off her cuckolded husband
The Discourse of nuclear proliferation legitimizes a system of domination to preserve the interest of the established nuclear powers.
Hugh Gusterson 1999, (Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, 14:1)[E.Berggren]
The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination
while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining
their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all the nations
of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents
these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is
another case of blaming the victim.
The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation
of "their" problems from "ours." In fact, however, we are linked to developing
nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render
these nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West
and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India
and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies
adopted by the British raj; and the dispute over Kashmir, identified by
Western commentators as a possible flash point for nuclear war, has its origins
not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain's decision in 1846 to install a Hindu
maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory (Burns 1998). The hostility between
Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention
in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More
recently, as Steven Green points out, "Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in
economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology
which has directly advanced Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely
this nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Congress has been so instrumental in
building up, that is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons
of various kinds" (1990).

Prolif K 1NC Shell 3/4

The affirmative’s attempt to avoid catastrophe ensures another Auschwitz and Hiroshima – we must express hope without solvency guarantees to prevent universal destruction
Fasching, 1993 (Darrell, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima)
Utopians seem to offer vague hopes for some unrealizable future. Realists want to know where they are going. Realists like to be in control of their destiny and thus prefer clear strategies, unambiguous goals and "final solutions." But after Auschwitz and Hiroshima we can no longer afford such final solutions. When the end is too clearly defined it too easily justifies the means. Utopians prefer to live in an unfinished world of proximate goals and partial solutions. Utopians prefer to keep the future ambiguously open to transcendence. The maxim of a utopian ethic could well be Ellul's, "think globally but act locally." When it comes to action, one must not be distracted by the global orientation of mass media. The place where the world can be transformed is precisely where it intersects with the experience of actual individuals and their particular communities. Utopians prefer to love their neighbor rather than "the world," understanding that the neighbor is, as the story of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:25ff) suggests, primarily the stranger, even the enemy, who by chance crosses our path. Utopians prefer an antibureaucratic ethic in which every means is measured by the unseen measure of human dignity. They are convinced that the utopian good is a good internal to the practice of creating community. If the means do not respect human dignity neither will the end. To the realist, all of this remains hopelessly utopian. Such utopianism has absolutely no chance of being effective or successful. And yet, even were that true, we ought to welcome the stranger. For being human is more important than exercising a will to power to be in control. We ought to act without clinging to the dharmas, a Buddhist might say, for we cannot stop time and control the destiny of the universe. Or to put it in the language of Paul, we ought to live every day as if our time was short, thus "buyers should conduct themselves as though they owned nothing, and those who make use of the world as though they were not using it, for the world as we know it is passing away" (1 Corinthians 7:30-31).

Prolif K 1NC Shell 4/4
Fear of the Third World’s lack of maturity or technological advancement reinforces dominant discourses of proliferation – Reject the affirmative to re-think problems dominated by First World Institutions.
Hugh Gusterson 1999, (Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, 14:1)[E.Berggren]
In the following pages I examine four popular arguments against horizontal
nuclear proliferation and suggest that all four are ideological and orientalist. The
arguments are that (1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear
weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World regimes
lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons; and (4)
Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons.
Each of these four arguments could as easily be turned backwards and used
to delegitimate Western nuclear weapons, as I show in the following commentary.
Sometimes, in the specialized literature of defense experts, one finds frank
discussion of near accidents, weaknesses, and anomalies in deterrence as it has
been practiced by the established nuclear powers, but these admissions tend to
be quarantined in specialized discursive spaces where the general public has little
access to them and where it is hard to connect them to the broader public discourse
on nuclear proliferation.7 In this article I retrieve some of these discussions
of flaws in deterrence from their quarantined spaces and juxtapose them
with the dominant discourse on the dangers of proliferation in order to destabilize
its foundational assumption of a secure binary distinction between "the
West" and "the Third World." It is my argument that, in the production of this
binary distinction, possible fears and ambivalences about Western nuclear
weapons are purged and recast as intolerable aspects of the Other. This purging
and recasting occurs in a discourse characterized by gaps and silences in its representation
of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its representation
of the Other's. Our discourse on proliferation is a piece of ideological machinery
that transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies.
I should clarify two points here. First, I am not arguing that there are, finally,
no differences between countries in terms of their reliability as custodians
of nuclear weapons. I am arguing that those differences are complex, ambiguous,
and crosscutting in ways that are not captured by a simple binary division between,
on the one hand, a few countries that have nuclear weapons and insist they are
safe and, on the other hand, those countries that do not have nuclear weapons
and are told they cannot safely acquire them. It is my goal here to demonstrate
the ways in which this simple binary distinction works as an ideological mechanism
to impede a more nuanced and realistic assessment of the polymorphous
dangers posed by nuclear weapons in all countries and to obscure recognition of
the ways in which our own policies in the West have often exacerbated dangers
in the Third World that, far from being simply the problems of the Other, are
problems produced by a world system dominated by First World institutions and

GNEP Revitalization CP 1/2
Observation 1: Text
The United States federal government should provide nuclear fuel services to countries seeking nuclear power, cooperate with countries in securing their plutonium stockpiles, devote higher research and development for nuclear battery concepts, and establish safeguards to secure its nuclear technology
Observation 2: Solvency
Counterplan is necessary to revitalize GNEP and solve for proliferation
Matthew Bunn is an Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research interests include nuclear theft and terrorism; nuclear proliferation and measures to control it; and the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, NOVEMBER 14, 2007, “Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing”, TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BUNN FOR THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, UNITED STATES SENATE,
As I mentioned at the outset, other elements of GNEP could be significant steps to reduce the proliferation risks of nuclear energy. Unfortunately, these other elements have not received comparable emphasis and funding in the program to date.
Fuel leasing. First, providing assured fuel services, so that countries have strong incentives not to build enrichment or reprocessing plants of their own, is a potentially important idea. The current emphasis is primarily on assured supplies of fresh nuclear fuel; while this is an important goal, it should be recognized that the commercial market already provides high assurance of fuel supply (except for countries that are special cases outside of or in violation of global nonproliferation norms, such as Iran and India). less need to build enrichment or reprocessing fuel leasing – that is, providing fresh fuel to countries with a promise to take the spent fuel away – would allow countries to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without having to build repositories. This would create a powerful new incentive for countries starting new nuclear energy programs to rely on foreign fuel supply rather than building enrichment and reprocessing of their own. (Note that existing reprocessing services offered by Britain and France, which require that the wastes be sent back to the customer, would not have this advantage.) Moreover, widespread fuel leasing would mean that plutonium-bearing spent fuel need not build up in countries all over the world. There are obvious political problems with one country taking another country’s spent fuel, but we should be working to address these problems – as we have in the case of taking back spent research reactor fuel. It is important to note that take-back of modest quantities of foreign spent fuel from the small numbers of reactors likely to be build in coming decades in new nuclear countries would not in any way require that this fuel be reprocessed. Russia has already passed legislation that allows it to enter the fuel leasing business, and signed a contract with Iran that requires all of Iran’s spent fuel to be shipped back to Russia. Other countries have considered being hosts for international waste storage facilities. It only takes one of the world’s 190 countries to agree to host an international repository (and if one country launched such an effort successfully, others might decide to compete with them in that highly profitable business). The country providing the fresh fuel and the country accepting the spent fuel would not necessarily have to be the same. The United States should be doing far more to make this vision a reality.
Reducing stockpiles of separated plutonium. Second, the huge global stocks of weapons-usable civilian separated plutonium – now as much as all the plutonium in all the world’s nuclear weapons stockpiles – pose significant risks, and continue to grow. Building a reprocessing plant or a single demonstration fast reactor in the United States will not do much to solve that problem. The United States should be doing much more to work with other countries to ensure that all these stockpiles are secured to the highest practicable standards, to limit or phase out unneeded plutonium separation where possible, and to ensure that plans are put in place for reducing these immense stocks over time. In particular, the Bush administration should renew the talks with Russia, almost

GNEP Revitalization CP 2/2
completed in the Clinton administration, concerning a 20-year moratorium on plutonium separation in both countries, and should cooperate with other countries to work out disposition paths for plutonium stockpiles for which there is no current plan for use or disposal.
Small, exportable reactors. Third, the concept that is sometimes called a “nuclear battery” – small reactors that might be produced in a factory, shipped to a deployment site with their fuel already included, generate electricity there for 10-20 years, and then be shipped back to the factory with their spent fuel – could make it possible to have widespread use of nuclear energy with little spread of sensitive materials and expertise and few proliferation risks. Within GNEP, even the small level of funding devoted to “small and medium reactors” is largely devoted to medium-sized reactors that could not be factory-built in this way. GNEP should devote higher priority to R&D on nuclear battery concepts, and particularly to approaches that might reduce their costs – currently the main barrier to implementing this approach.
Advanced safeguards development. Fourth, as the American Physical Society has pointed out, the United States needs a major reinvestment in safeguards and security technologies to support a new nuclear era. DOE is taking the first steps in that direction, but much more needs to be done.

Clean Coal 1NC 1/2
A. Clean coal is winning the competition against renewables now
USA Today, 12/27/07, “Tech could reduce coal facilities' emissions,” p. Lexis
"Coal is abundant and cheap, and we have increasing energy demand," he says "We can wish all we want, but people are going to do what it takes to keep the lights on. And that means coal." Others, such as environmentalist John Blair, who lives about an hour south of Edwardsport and is fighting the plant, say more coal isn't inevitable. "The plant is not needed, because we have incredible (energy) efficiency potential in this state," Blair says. "That's cheaper than a new coal plant." Even worse, says Bruce Nilles, who directs the Sierra Club's anti-coal campaign, is that investment in new coal plants -- gasification or not -- will drain resources from cleaner options. "No investor in their right mind will put money up for renewable energy, because there will be no market for it." Only about 2% of U.S. electricity comes from non-hydropower renewables such as wind power. "The fact is, we don't have a good alternative to fossil fuels at this time," Herzog says. "People want the world the way they want it, but we have to look at the facts."

B. Renewable energies will trade off with clean coal if their cost decreases
Tim Burrows, Director in Climate Managers’ Melbourne Office, 4/6/07, Concentration Thermal Power Comes of Age, http://www.climatemanagers. com/index.php?Itemid=34&id=51& option=com_content&task=view
In the Australian context, all renewables must inevitably be compared to coal fired power incorporating carbon capture and storage. Studies have suggested that this type of generation will add between 50% and 100% to the cost of generation, which suggests that a clean coal plant will be capable of generating low carbon electricity at between $45 and $70 per MWh. While there are many issues yet to be resolved in relation to this type of generation, there is no technical reason why the technology should not work, hence one must conclude that in the absence of external market distortions, renewable energy will only supplant clean coal if the cost of renewable electricity generation is at least equal to that available from a clean coal plant.

C. Coal is key to the economy
Frank Burke, vice president of the Research and Development Consol Energy Inc., 4/27/07, “Sustainable Low Emission Electricity Generation”, __http:// q=cache:s9HW7uGJx9AJ:www.nma. org/pdf/cong_test/burke_ 042704.pd__)
The United States is not unique in its dependence on coal, and it is vital to our national interest to promote the increased use of coal not only domestically, but worldwide as a key component of our energy and economic security. The most compelling evidence of this is China. This year, the Chinese will mine and consume 1.5 billion tons of coal. In 15 years, they will consume 2.5 billion tons; China’s increase alone will equal our current consumption. They expect to double their coal-fueled electricity generating capacity to 600 GW by 2020. By 2040, the Chinese expect to use 4 billion tons of coal annually.
Throughout the world, economic growth and political stability are tied to electrification, and electricity is tied to coal. Therefore, the desire and, in fact, the necessity of the world to utilize its abundant coal resources will not be denied. Energy availability and energy quality are key to meeting all three aspects of sustainable development: economic, societal and environmental. The question is not whether we need or will use coal for human development, but how we will use it.

Clean Coal 1NC 2/2
D. Nuclear war
Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations, 8/23/92, World Policy Institute

Hundreds of millions – billions – of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles – and drawn closer to the west – because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can’t? What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India – these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 30s.

1NC Econ Frontline 1/4

1. There are a lot of hidden fees to nuclear power plants that make it damaging to the economy.
Lionel Beehner, senior writer at the Council for Foreign Relations, 4-25-06, “Chernobyl, Nuclear Power, and Foreign Policy”, publication/10534/chernobyl _nuclear_power_ and_foreign_policy.html,
The thirty-one reactors now said to be under construction (probably ten of those will never be completed) are being built with governmental subsidies. In the United States, utilities and Wall Street have made clear that new reactors will be built only with taxpayer loan guarantees and other assistance. Federal support for energy technologies is not necessarily bad, but should be unnecessary for a mature technology like nuclear power—already the most subsidized energy source in the U.S. over the past 50 years. That taxpayers are being asked to shoulder the burden of new reactors—in the United States and across the globe—is an indication that nuclear power’s economics simply aren’t viable. And I haven’t yet addressed all of the ancillary (and expensive) facilities and issues that would be required to support a nuclear power revival: new radioactive waste dumps, when no country has yet been able to build even one permanent waste facility; new uranium enrichment plantsa proliferation problem as is plainly evident over Iran’s program; a greater risk of accident, terrorism and attack; a lack of qualified people to build, operate and regulate reactors; and, since uranium is a finite resource, a resort to reprocessing and the subsequent treatment of plutonium as a commodity—which should frighten anyone concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons

1NC Econ Frontline 2/4
2. High construction costs will translate into high electricity prices- this bombs the economy
Johnson 08 (Keith Johnson, It’s the Economics, Stupid: Nuclear Power’s Bogeyman, Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2008, __ environmentalcapital/2008/05/ 12/its-the-economics-stupid- nuclear-powers-bogeyman/__)
It turns out nuclear power’s biggest worry isn’t Yucca Mountain, Three Mile Island ghosts, or environmental protesters. It’s economics. Rebecca Smith reports today in the WSJ (sub reqd.) on the biggest hurdle to the nascent nuclear-energy revival in the U.S.—skyrocketing construction costs. Though all power sectors are affected to different degrees by rising capital costs, nuclear power’s vulnerability puts it in a class by itself. Notes the paper: A new generation of nuclear power plants is on the drawing boards in the U.S., but the projected cost is causing some sticker shock: $5 billion to $12 billion a plant, double to quadruple earlier rough estimates. Part of the cost escalation is bad luck. Plants are being proposed in a period of skyrocketing costs for commodities such as cement, steel and copper; amid a growing shortage of skilled labor; and against the backdrop of a shrunken supplier network for the industry. Over the last five years, cost estimates for new nuclear power plants have been continually revised upward. Even the bean counters can’t keep pace. The paper notes: Estimates released in recent weeks by experienced nuclear operators — NRG Energy Inc., Progress Energy Inc., Exelon Corp., Southern Co. and FPL Group Inc. — “have blown by our highest estimate” of costs computed just eight months ago, said Jim Hempstead, a senior credit officer at Moody’s Investors Service credit-rating agency in New York. Why is that such a big deal? Coal plants have been shelved recently because of rising capital costs, and renewable energy isn’t immune, either—and the nuclear power industry enjoys healthy loan guarantees and other federal subsidies designed precisely to alleviate those kinds of uncertainties. It matters because nuclear power’s ability to provide electricity at a competitive price compared to regular sources like coal and natural gas depends largely on those construction costs. Fuel costs for nuclear power are miniscule. The only way to handicap the field in nuclear power’s favor is to put a big price tag on emissions of carbon dioxide. Since nuclear plants don’t emit CO2, they win when legislation penalizes carbon-heavy sectors like coal (and even natural gas). The Congressional Budget Office just finished a rosy-glasses report on nuclear economics. Even while acknowledging that historical costs for nuclear plants always doubled or tripled their initial estimates, the CBO took heart from promises made by manufacturers of next-generation reactors and a single on-time and on-budget project in Japan to project cheaper nuclear construction costs in the future. And if those cost estimates are wrong? From the CBO: If those factors turned out not to reduce construction costs in the United States, nuclear capacity would probably be an unattractive investment even with EPAct incentives, unless substantial carbon dioxide charges were imposed. Everybody from John McCain to Newt Gingrich to Patrick Moore is pitching more nuclear power as a zero-emissions answer to America’s energy needs. The question, though, is the same: Who’s going to pay for it?

1NC Econ Frontline 3/4
  1. Many of the plants will default and it’ll cost billions

Clayton 07 (Mark Clayton, Staff Writer, Christian Science Monitor, Nuclear power surge coming, Sept. 28, 2007, __ 0928/p01s05-usgn.html__)
The nuclear industry has already put Congress on notice that it could require loan guarantees of at least $20 billion for planned projects – and more later, NEI officials told The New York Times in July. The reason is that nuclear power plants are far more expensive to build than coal- or gas-fired facilities. For example: On Monday, New Jersey-based NRG Energy Corp. filed its application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build two reactors in Texas at a cost between $5.4 and $6.7 billion. That huge startup cost might make financial sense, given a reactor's low operating expenses, especially if government begins to charge utilities for the greenhouse gases they produce. Nuclear power is virtually emission-free. But the last time that the nuclear industry was on a building spree – in the 1980s – roughly half of the power plants proposed were never finished, in part because of fears caused by the accident at Three Mile Island. Those that were finished were delayed for years and cost far more than estimated. A number of power companies went bankrupt. In late 2003, NRG – the company that filed Monday's permit application – emerged from bankruptcy caused by overexpansion in the 1990s. If defaults occur in the new round, critics worry federal costs will be huge. "This is the second or third 'nuclear renaissance' I've seen," says Tyson Slocum, director of energy program at Public Citizen, Ralph Nader's consumer-protection group. "When you look at the cost of these plants and the massive financial subsidies by US taxpayers, I think that money would be better invested in cheaper sources of emissions-free power that don't have the fatal flaws nuclear power does." In 2003, a Congressional Budget Office analysis warned of potential default rates of 50 percent or more on new plants.
  1. Nuclear power can’t increase jobs, not enough workers.

Lavelle 08 (Marianne Lavelle, A Worker Shortage in the Nuclear Industry, March 13, 2008, U.S. News & World Report, __ articles/business/careers/ 2008/03/13/a-worker-shortage- in-the-nuclear-industry_print. htm__)
The reason for the hurry: Big energy construction will be booming in the next decade, concentrated in the South—not only nuclear generators but coal plants, liquefied natural gas terminals, oil refineries, and electricity transmission lines. All projects need skilled craft workers, and they are in drastically short supply. The utility Southern Co. estimates that existing energy facilities already are short 20,000 workers in the Southeast. That shortfall will balloon to 40,000 by 2011 because of the new construction. Pay is inching up and hours are increasing for workers who are certified craftsmen. Fluor says skilled workers at the Oak Grove coal project are putting in 60-hour weeks instead of the well-into-overtime 50-hour weeks that had been planned. Looking ahead, the nuclear industry views itself as especially vulnerable to the skilled-labor shortage. It hasn't had to recruit for decades. Not only were no nuke plants getting built, but workers in the 104 atomic facilities already in operation tended to stay in their well-paid jobs for years. But in the next five years, just as the industry hopes to launch a renaissance, up to 19,600 nuclear workers—35 percent of the workforce—will reach retirement age. "The shortage of skilled labor and the rising average age of workers in the electric industry are a growing concern," likely to push up the cost of nuclear power plant construction, said Standard & Poor's Rating Services in a recent report. The nuclear industry faces a different world compared with when it last was hiring three decades ago. "Parents, guidance counselors, and society in general push high school students to complete their secondary education with the intention of then attending a four-year college program," concludes a recent white paper on the Southeast workforce issues prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute. "High-paying skilled labor jobs, once considered excellent career options, are now perceived as second class."

1NC Econ Frontline 4/4

5. Radiation from nuclear waste causes public health issues that are extremely expensive to take care of.
Susan Sargent, “Nuclear Power No Relief From Energy Woes”, __ views01/0519-04.htm__, 2001
Nuclear reactors generate long-lived, highly radioactive wastes that need to be carefully isolated and stored. Some scientists conclude that it is virtually impossible to assure that fission-reactor wastes would not pose unacceptable risks to current and future generations. Utilities have not found one single safe site for storage, or a secure method to transport radioactive waste. In the U.S., public acceptability considerations led Congress to choose the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada, although it wasn't the optimal technical solution. Despite initial claims of "too cheap to meter," nuclear power in the United States has become too expensive to afford. The nuclear industry has received over the years, 60 percent of all federal energy research and development dollars. Yet customers of nuclear utilities still pay far higher prices than their conventionally supplied counterparts. A 1993 Energy Information Agency study found the average bill from a nuclear utility was more than two dollars per kilowatt hour higher and nearly $17 per month than from a conventional utility. Why the disparity despite the huge government handout? Because utilities have been unable to control the costs of constructions, retrofits, repairs, and maintenance, while storing waste pushed costs even higher. In France, the nation that made the biggest investment in nuclear energy, the national utility, Electricite de France, is carrying a $30 billion
debt, mostly because of its nuclear investments.

Case – Russia 1NC 1/4
A. The world’s dependence on Russia is increasing – especially the U.S.
Marshall I. Goldman, Kathryn Wasserman Davis Professor of Russian Economics (Emeritus) at Wellesley College, former associate Director of the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University from 1975 to 2006, M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Russian studies and economics from Harvard University, honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Fulbright-Hayes Lecturer at Moscow State University, State Department consultant, May 27, 2008, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia, Oxford University Press, Pg. 3-7
But it is not only Europe that finds itself each day becoming more and more dependent on energy exports from Russia. Although the United States is separated from Russia by oceans, it also is beginning to import and consume more and more Russian energy. As in Europe, the United States is trying to reduce its overreliance on energy imports from the Middle East. As part of this diversification, in 2005 the United States imported dose to $8 billion worth of Russian petroleum. In woO, that jumped by 25 percent to $1o billion. True, that represented only 3 percent of our petroleum imports small, but an increase from the 2.2 percent of 2004 and a hint that we are likely to increase imports in the future.' More than that, in woo, LUKoi1, one of Russia largest private oil companies, purchased nearly 3,000 filling stations in the United States from Getty Oil and Mobil and is now busily converting them into LUKoil outlets. It also should be noted that in woO, Russia became the world's largest producer of petroleum, producing more than Saudi Arabia. This is not the first time Russia has produced more petroleum than anyone else. It also reigned as the world's largest producer in the late 1970s and 198os. Even this was not unprecedented. As Table Intro. r indicates, Czarist Russia from 1898 to 1901 also produced more oil than the United States, until then the leader.

Case – Russia 1NC 2/4
B. Plan prevents need to import LNG from Russia by alleviating gas demand, lowering prices
Ryan Wiser and Mark Bolinger, research scientists @ Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Concerns about the price and supply of natural gas in the US have grown in recent years, and futures and options markets predict high prices and significant price volatility for the immediate future. Whether we are witnessing the beginning of a major long-term nationwide crisis or a costly but shorter-term supply demand adjustment remains to be seen. Results presented in this article suggest that resource diversification, in particular increased investments in renewable energy, could help alleviate the threat of high gas prices over the short and long term. By displacing gas-fired generation, increased deployment of renewable energy is expected to reduce natural gas demand and consequently put downward pressure on gas prices. A review of the economics literature shows that this secondary effect is to be expected and can be measured with the inverse price elasticity of natural gas supply. Because of the respective shapes of long- and short-term supply curves, the long-term price response is expected to be less significant than the shorter-term response. The effect of this natural gas price reduction may not entirely represent an increase in aggregate economic wealth, and may in part reflect a benefit to natural gas consumers that comes at the expense of natural gas producers. Conventional economics does not generally support government intervention for the sole reason of shifting the demand curve for natural gas and thereby reducing gas prices. If policymakers are uniquely concerned about the impact of gas prices on consumers, however, or are concerned about the potentially harmful macroeconomic impacts of higher gas prices or on increasing imports of natural gas, then policies to reduce gas demand may be considered appropriate. It also deserves note that this secondary gas-price-suppression form of risk mitigation is additional to the direct risk-reducing benefit of replacing variable-priced natural gas with fixed-price renewable energy.

C. Russia’s economy is dependent upon the exports and world prices of LNG
Peter Roberts, Esq. and Igor Makarov, Esq., Jones Day, Moscow, September, 2005, “Russia and the Growth of LNG”, Russian Petroleum Investor (RPI), __ Publication/c2ed834c-d309- 43e9-bbf5-6a2bce477ff1/ Presentation/ PublicationAttachment/ e65021ea-0bdd-4c30-be18- 70d406261c26/Russia092005.pdf__ [Bapodra
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the required levels of energy sector investment in Russia over the next 25 years could amount to some $900 billion. Whilst much of that investment will come from Russian domestic players keen to consolidate their position, international investors will also have a part to play. There will be stiff competition for investment into available upstream, midstream and downstream opportunities in Russia from the full range of the international oil companies but also from national oil companies (particularly from resource-hungry countries such as India, Japan and China) who are looking to secure interests in strategic reserves. Thus far, the history of foreign investment into Russia’s energy sector has been somewhat chequered. Examples of successful foreign investment to date are BP’s participation in TNKBP and ConocoPhillips’ investment into Lukoil. On the other hand, in August of this year Total announced that it had withdrawn its planned investment into Novatek and the position on the prospects for foreign investment into the Shtokman project (see below) is continuing to be slow to define itself. Recently proposed amendments to the Russian Subsoil Law which may restrict the ability of companies with majority foreign interests to take part in subsoil license auctions bring additional uncertainty to the Russian investment climate.
In 2004 Russia’s GDP grew by approximately 7%, faster than the average growth rates in all other G8 countries. Russia’s economic growth over the last 5 years has been driven primarily by energy exports, particularly in consequence of the boom in Russian oil production and high world oil prices during this period. Such growth has made the Russian economy dangerously dependent on oil and gas exports however, and especially vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices.

Case – Russia 1NC 3/4
D. Russian economic collapse causes a civil war that escalates and goes nuclear
Steven David, political scientist, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 1999, p. 19990101faessay955/steven-r- david/saving-america-from-the- coming-civil-wars.html
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

Case – Russia 1NC 4/4
E. Turns Case- Cooperation on LNG is key to U.S.-Russia relations
George W. Bush, the president of the United States, February 24, 2005, “President and President Putin Discuss Strong U.S.-Russian Partnership”, news/releases/2005/02/ 20050224-9.html

Another important and interesting opportunity is our cooperation in the supplies of liquified natural gas. In the year 2010, 2011, a large amount of liquified natural gas can be supplied from Russia to the United States. Our investment corporation is becoming generally bilateral. The first steps -- but constant steps are being made by Russian companies that are starting to invest their capital into American economy. We have also discussed the status and prospects of Russia's cooperation in science, high-tech; in particular, in the exploration of outer space. In conclusion, I would like to say that I highly appreciate the outcome of this summit. Later this year, we are going to meet a few more times within the framework of various international fora. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the President of the United States who has accepted the invitation to participate in the festivities on the occasion of the anniversary of the great victory on May 9th in Moscow. This is a natural manifestation of respect of historic memory and the memory of the alliance that bonded our two countries in the years of the second world war.

Case – Leadership 1NC
It’s impossible to stop the nuclear proliferation system, it evolves and circumvents at attempts of prevention
[Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center’s Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author]
Following the earlier discussion of surprise, it is necessary to think much more explicitly about both buyers and suppliers in a nuclear proliferation system. Specifically, consideration needs to be given to those entities, both state and non-state, seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as those entities—states, firms, individuals, and criminal organizations—that wittingly or unwittingly, become involved in the supply of knowledge, materials, or production equipment that facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nuclear proliferation system is co-evolving in a fitness landscape with nonproliferation policies, strategies, norms, and institutions. Consequently, it is adapting in ways that circumvent the constraints and restrictions imposed by nonproliferation efforts. Its continued ability to do this depends on the relative capacity of each side for learning.
How might proliferation networks morph in the future? It is clear that proliferation networks and their relationships, commodity flows, and financial flows constantly morph in response to pressures and opportunities. One possibility, therefore, is to think in terms of multiple networks—each with its own distinct characteristics and approach (within technological constraints) to facilitating nuclear weapons development. In a world of inter-connectedness, it is also necessary to consider the possibility of some kind of association or linkage between criminal networks which have obtained access to fissionable material and a network akin to that of A.Q. Khan.

Anti-Americanism overwhelms any diplomacy- it has been extensive for the past five years. Iraq was a demarcation in global public opinion
[Raasch, 07 (Charles, GNS political writer, 7/4/07, USA Today, “Next president faces the ultimate challenge” opinion/columnist/raasch/2007- 06-28-american-image_N.htm)]
In most of the nations surveyed, "public opinion (is) increasingly wary of the world's dominant nations and disapproving of their leaders," Kohut's report says. "Anti-Americanism is extensive, as it has been for the past five years. At the same time, the image of China has slipped significantly among the publics of other major nations. Opinion about Russia is mixed, but confidence in its president, Vladimir Putin, has declined sharply." Kohut said the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a demarcation point in global public opinion, not so much as a fresh anti-American spark but as a confirmation of simmering anti-Americanism, especially among Muslims. Kohut's organization this spring surveyed, usually face-to-face, 45,239 people in 46 countries and the Palestinian territories. The usual obstacles loomed in less-free nations. You can't poll the Chinese about their leaders, Kohut said. Pew didn't delve into public opinion in Cuba, North Korea or in Iran, where pollsters have been jailed for asking questions. Iraq wasn't surveyed, either. Favorable views of the United States have slipped -- in some cases precipitously -- since 2000 in most countries around the globe, except for a cluster of African nations, Japan, South Korea and India. The view of the United States among Germans has decreased from 80 percent favorable in 2000 to just 30 percent now. Turkey has plummeted from 52 percent to a paltry 9 percent. In Egypt, only 20 percent had a favorable view of the United States; just 13 percent approved in the Palestinian territories. Conversely, 78 percent of Israelis held favorable views of the United States. In all but one country surveyed, majorities -- in some cases big majorities -- said the United States promoted democracy only when it fit the broad strategic goals of the United States. Democrats have seized on America's eroded image overseas as a case for a new party in the White House. In an early June New Hampshire debate, ex-Sen. John Edwards said "the single greatest responsibility of the next president" will be to "speak to the world about what real American values are -- equality, diversity -- and to lead an effort by America to re-establish our alliances around the world." Bush tapped former campaign adviser Karen Hughes to lead the State Department's public diplomacy unit. But Kohut said there was not much Hughes could do, especially among Muslims. "In order to really change things with regards to the image of the United States from the point of view of Muslim people, you have to change American policies, not do a better job of explaining them," Kohut said.

Case – Leadership 1NC
Nuclear power plants are not secure against aerial terrorist attacks. Such an attack would spark a meltdown and widespread radiation.
[Mark Holt, “Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack”, http://interestingenergyfacts. energy-safety-report-for.html , 2005]
Protection of nuclear power plants from land-based assaults, deliberate aircraft crashes, and other terrorist acts has been a heightened national priority since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has strengthened its regulations on nuclear reactor security, but critics contend that implementation by the industry has been too slow and that further measures are needed. Several bills to increase nuclear reactor security measures and requirements were introduced after the 9/11 attacks, along with provisions in an omnibus energy bill considered in the 108th Congress (H.R. 6). None of those measures were enacted, but further action on omnibus energy legislation is anticipated in the 109th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets of terrorist attacks, and critics have long questioned the adequacy of the measures required of nuclear plant operators to defend against such attacks. Nuclear power plants were designed to withstand hurricanes, earthquakes, and other extreme events, but attacks by large airliners loaded with fuel, such as those that crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, were not contemplated when design requirements were determined. A taped interview shown September 10, 2002, on Arab TV station al-Jazeera, which contains a statement that Al Qaeda initially planned to include a nuclear plant in its 2001 attack sites, intensified concern about aircraft crashes. In light of the possibility that an air attack might penetrate the containment building of a nuclear plant, some interest groups have suggested that such an event could be followed by a meltdown and widespread radiation exposure.

Case – Solvency 1NC 1/3
Turn - Nuclear plants leak radiation into local water supplies and causes drought.
[Vicki Wolf, Writer for Clean energy, “The Dirt on Nuclear Power “, energy/features/nuclear2008. htm, 2008]
People living in Goliad County, Texas know first hand the problems uranium mining can bring. Families living near the uranium mining areas in Goliad County, Texas have been unable to get the companies to clean up mining sites. The Railroad Commission, responsible for setting rules for mining and enforcing them, has been lax in both areas. According to Cyrus Reed, Lone Star Sierra Club conservation director, some wells down-flow of the mining have high levels of radioactivity and some are contaminated with a sludge that contains metallic deposits. At least one family has stopped using their well water and now imports water. While uranium mining poisons ground water, nuclear plant operations use millions of gallons of water per minute, sending it back to its source lifeless. Tennessee Valley Authority plants in Alabama and Tennessee have been shut down because of drought, and others in the Southeast may be shut down if the drought continues.

Nuclear plants kill millions of fish.
[Vicki Wolf, Writer for Clean energy, “The Dirt on Nuclear Power”, energy/features/nuclear2008. htm, 2008]
Nuclear energy is being promoted as clean energy. While it’s true that nuclear power plants don’t emit green house gases that fuel global warming, the mining of uranium to fuel these plants is anything but clean. Water use is another issue. Millions of gallons of water per minute are boiled in the process of making electricity. In that process millions of fish are killed and all aquatic life is strained before the water is returned to its source. The yet unsolved nasty problem of long-term disposal of dangerous radioactive spent fuel is perhaps the greatest deterrent of all to nuclear power as a viable energy source.Fish larvae and other forms of aquatic life are strained from the water as it travels through thousands of metal tubes to become steam that turns the turbines to make electricity, then back through the system to be cooled and returned to its source. A 2005 study found that one coastal power plant in Southern California impinged nearly 3-and-a-half million fish in just one year.

Case – Solvency 1NC 2/3
Fish key to biodiversity. Lack of biodiversity is detrimental.
[Karl Blankenship, Editor of the Bay Journal (huge fishing bay periodical), December 2006, “Loss of biodiversity a threat to future of world's fisheries”, ( q=cache:dFfXSBnsIuIJ:www. 3Farticle%3D2955+fish+ important+factor+in+ biodiversity&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd= 1&gl=us)]
The cumulative loss of large fish—sharply reduces the ability of sea life to resist diseases, filter pollutants and rebound from stresses such as overfishing and climate change, the scientists said. If current trends continue, the scientists predict a global collapse of fish stocks in the middle of the century—an argument disputed by other fishery scientists. “Whether we looked at tide pools or studies over the entire world’s ocean, we saw the same picture emerging,” said Boris Worm of Dalhousie University, the lead author of the paper. “In losing species, we lose the productivity and stability of entire ecosystems. I was shocked and disturbed by how consistent those trends are—beyond anything we suspected.” The study did not involve new research, but relied on existing data collected in studies around the world. The scientists examined results from dozens of controlled small-scale studies in coastal areas that manipulated aquatic populations in local areas. The studies showed that on average, the greater the species diversity in an area, the greater its production and stability—a pattern that was reversed as species were removed. They saw the same picture emerge when looking at regional coastal areas. The healthiest systems had higher rates of biodiversity. But areas that lost species—or where populations of critical species such as filter-feeding animals or seagrasses had been dramatically reduced—were more susceptible to harmful algae blooms, eutrophication, fish kills, beach closures and other problems. Turning their attention to large ocean areas, the scientists drew on long-term fisheries records, and concluded that large marine ecosystems with greater diversity of fish species were less prone to stock collapses than areas with fewer species. “We were all kind of blown away by the consistency of the patterns that we see from the smallest to the largest scales,” said Emmett Duffy, a fisheries scientist at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, and one of the paper’s 14 co-authors. “The global fisheries data mirror the kinds of patterns that we see in small controlled experiments, and in fact are predicted by simple general theory.” Conservationists and many scientists have long argued that maintaining species diversity—including small, overlooked species which may unknowingly play important ecological roles—is important for healthy, functioning ecosystems. The Science paper sought to apply that concept to broader marine systems. “The basic analogy is that an ecosystem is sort of like a machine, and that you need a lot of the parts interacting with one another to support what it does,” Duffy said. “What it does in our case is produce fish and crab harvests, oysters and clean waters. You need a lot of those other inconspicuous species that we don’t think about much to provide sort of a natural infrastructure that supports the products that we take out. When you start losing the parts of that machine, it breaks down.” In the Bay region, for instance, a die-off of seagrasses in the 1930s closed the bay scallop fishery as the beds, which were critical habitat for the scallops, quickly declined. Likewise, Duffy said, the demise of oysters in the Bay led to a loss of habitat for a variety of reef-dependent species, and the loss of the oysters’ filtering ability contributed to poorer water quality in the Chesapeake. Conversely, the scientists said, systems that maintain healthy and diverse populations are more productive, and bounce back from disturbances more readily. “The main thing about the loss of species is there is this web of complex interactions that starts getting fouled up when species are lost,” Duffy said. “And that ultimately ripples out to affect the things that we care about like fish production and clean water.” A more controversial conclusion of the study was a projection which, using collapsed fish stocks as a proxy for loss of diversity, indicates that wild fish stocks being used for seafood would face global collapse by 2048. “There are some good arguments about biodiversity,” Doug Lipton, an economist and fisheries scientist with the University of Maryland, said of the paper. But he said the fisheries prediction was based on a “big if”—that fisheries would continue to collapse at the same rate as in the past. In fact, he said, other factors, such as the economics of different fisheries, affect overfishing. And the biology of some species—such as those with low reproductive rates—make them more susceptible to overfishing than others. “The species that are most susceptible to collapse have already collapsed,” he said. Ed Houde, a fishery scientist with the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science who has served on many national and international committees dealing with fishing issues, agreed that “fisheries have serious problems, we all know that.” But, he added “in the year 2048, short of an asteroid hitting the Earth, I think we’ll still have some pretty productive fisheries.” In particular, Houde—in an point also cited by others—faulted the assumption in the paper that a stock was “collapsed” if harvests were 10 percent of their historic highs. Often, peak harvests for many species are not indicators of abundance, he said, and many peak catches were dramatically above sustainable levels. It’s probable, Houde said, that catches that were only 10 percent of historic levels may be the appropriate harvest rate for some
Case – Solvency 1NC 3/3
species now being regulated. Globally, he said, fish management has improved and become more precautionary, and U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization figures show that the number of fish stocks in trouble is slowly being reduced. Regionally, he said, a more precautionary approach to fisheries management can be seen in the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s recent action to cap menhaden catches in the Bay, despite its own stock assessment which indicated the coastwide menhaden stock was healthy. “That was an ecosystem approach that was taken because we were worried about food for predators and the ecosystem services of filtering by menhaden,” Houde said. “We made a social decision that was a precautionary one, recognized ecosystem services and capped the fishery.” Other scientists have argued that, especially in coastal areas, pollution is a major—and potentially larger—threat to biodiversity than over fishing. While that may be true for coastal areas including the Bay, Duffy said overfishing is almost certainly the more important factor affecting biodiversity in oceans. Outweigh on quals, these people monitor fish population and shit for a living in one of the finest fisheries in the world.

Collapse of marine biodiversity means extinction
NOAA 98 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1998 (Year of the Ocean Report, yoto/meeting/mar_env_316.html)
<The ocean plays a critical role in sustaining the life of this planet. Every activity, whether natural or anthropogenic, has far reaching impacts on the world at large. For example, excessive emissions of greenhouse gases may contribute to an increase the sea level, and cause potential flooding or an increase in storm frequency; this flooding can reduce wetland acreage and increase sediment and nutrient flows into the Gulf of Mexico, causing adverse impacts on water quality and reducing habitat for commercial fisheries. This in turn drives up the cost of fish at local markets nationwide. The environment and the economic health of marine and coastal waters are linked at the individual, community, state, regional, national and international levels. The interdependence of the economy and the environment are widely recognized. The United States has moved beyond viewing health, safety, and pollution control as additional costs of doing business to an understanding of broader stewardship, recognizing that economic and social prosperity would be useless if the coastal and marine environments are compromised or destroyed in the process of development (President's Council on Sustainable Development, 1996). Much about the ocean, its processes, and the interrelationship between land and sea is unknown. Many harvested marine resources depend upon a healthy marine environment to exist. Continued research is needed so that sound management decisions can be made when conflicts among users of ocean resources arise. Although much progress has been made over the past 30 years to enhance marine environmental quality and ocean resources, much work remains. The challenge is to maintain and continue to improve marine water quality as more people move to the coasts and the pressures of urbanization increase. Through education, partnerships, technological advances, research, and personal responsibility, marine environmental quality should continue to improve, sustaining resources for generations to come."It does not matter where on Earth you live, everyone is utterly dependent on the existence of that lovely, living saltwater soup. There's plenty of water in the universe without life, but nowhere is there life without water. The living ocean drives planetary chemistry, governs climate and weather, and otherwise provides the cornerstone of the life-support system for all creatures on our planet, from deep-sea starfish to desert sagebrush. That's why the ocean matters. If the sea is sick, we'll feel it. If it dies, we die. Our future and the state of the oceans are one."