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ISPEC

A. The aff must specify the type of incentive they use.
Incentive specification key to policymaking and disad links
David M Driesen. Spring 98. “Is emissions trading an economic incentive program?: Replacing the command and control/economic incentive dichotomy,” Washington and Lee Law review __http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_qa3655/is_199804/ ai_n8791954/print__ [Takumi Murayama]

Any meaningful theory of economic incentives must address several key questions. What precisely does a proposed program provide incentives to do? Who will create the incentives? A theory that focuses on these questions helps analyze claims that emissions trading offers free market-like dynamic advantages - inducement of innovation and continuous environmental improvement - central to its attractiveness. It clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of traditional regulation. It shows that much more useful things can be done with the concept of economic incentives than trade emission reduction obligations. A theory of economic incentives may help create more dynamic and effective environmental law.

B. The aff fails to specify what type of incentive they use.

C. Standards -

1. Limits–Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. The term “alternative energy” is already unlimiting enough we should at least get to know what type of incentive the affirmative is using to limit the topic. Key CP ground is lost; the aff should be able to defend the type of incentive they do in the plan.

2. Predictability–It’s totally unpredictable what the 1AC becomes in the 2AC after the addition of add-ons; there is already in-round abuse from the 1AC, since the aff strat after the 1AC can change 180°.
D. T is a voter for fairness and education. The way the aff defines the round does not reward strategic thinking where the neg can run solvency deficits or counterplans on “incentives” and decrease education on in-depth debates about incentives.

Security K 1NC 1/6
Our fear of the “inevitable attack” on the US allows descisons to be made on lies and deception to instill fear into the public justifying our actions in the name of national security
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Our invasion of Iraq reflects the web of deception that the Bush administration, through its "war on terrorism," has woven around the events of that September morning. By all objective evidence Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, but as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested on the day after the attacks, the broad definition of that "war" would require us to invade Iraq. At that moment, Iraq rose to the surface from the deeper dreams and visions of our leaders— and so the moment became one of opportunity. To facilitate that policy our leaders then either made, or encouraged by innuendo, the false claim that Iraq was indeed implicated in 9/11, and by the time of the invasion about 50 percent of Americans had come to believe that falsehood. A deception on such a large scale could only occur because Americans remained genuinely fearful of terrorist attacks even more lethal than 9/11, and because that fear, that sense of vulnerability, could be manipulated to support larger and more ambitious policy aims. It became possible to redirect the fear from Osama bin Laden to another hated Middle Eastern figure, Saddam Hussein, to the point where the two became virtually interchangeable. If anything, American fear of another 9/11 has been intensified by the "successful" invasion and so remains available for use in other situations.




The paranoia of inevitable annihilation associated with superpower syndrome – legitimizes violence under the mask of “security”.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Inseparable from this grandiosity is the paranoid edge of the apocalyptic mindset. Leader and followers feel themselves constantly under attack—threatened not just with harm but with annihilation. For them that would mean the obliteration of everything of value on this degraded planet, of the future itself. They must destroy the world in order to survive themselves. This is why they in turn feel impelled to label as absolute evil and annihilate any group that seems to impede their own sacred mission. Such a sense of paranoid aggressiveness is more readily detectable in the case of certified zealots like Asahara or bin Laden. But it is by no means absent from the minds of American strategists who, though possessing overwhelming military dominance, express constant fear of national annihilation, and embark upon aggressive or "preemptive" military actions.


Security K 1NC 2/6
Proliferation in the Third World is seen as irrational acts of passion which must be controlled by the strong hand of the US.
Hugh Gusterson 1999, (Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, 14:1)[E.Berggren]
Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms
of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual,
has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with
male human rationality (Haraway 1990; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus
certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast
proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery that carries a subtle feminine
or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having "vital
interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World nations have "passions,"
"longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be controlled and
contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an evident
ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Times editorial (1987a:A34). Peter
Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot
forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings" (1987:A27). Representative Ed
Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington
Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that
the Pakistanis "can feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military
aid from America" (1987:A22). The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging
off her cuckolded husband
The Discourse of nuclear proliferation legitimizes a system of domination to preserve the interest of the established nuclear powers.
Hugh Gusterson 1999, (Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, 14:1)[E.Berggren]
The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination
while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining
their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all the nations
of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents
these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is
another case of blaming the victim.
The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation
of "their" problems from "ours." In fact, however, we are linked to developing
nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render
these nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West
and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India
and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies
adopted by the British raj; and the dispute over Kashmir, identified by
Western commentators as a possible flash point for nuclear war, has its origins
not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain's decision in 1846 to install a Hindu
maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory (Burns 1998). The hostility between
Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention
in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More
recently, as Steven Green points out, "Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in
economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology
which has directly advanced Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely
this nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Congress has been so instrumental in
building up, that is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons of various kinds" (1990).

Security K 1NC 3/6
The insistence on the conventional, decisive conflicts of air power ignores the reality of modern asymmetric warfare. This re-entrenchs comfort in old ways of thought at the expense of military effectiveness.
MAJOR MICHAEL A. O’HALLORAN, USMC, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE
JUNE 99 "KILL IS A KILL: ASYMMETRICALLY ATTACKING U.S. AIRPOWER"
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/saas/ohalloran.pdf

Non-conventional, or asymmetric tactics are not new to the fair-fighting practitioners of Western warfare, but they have always been hated. The ancient Greeks, who preferred their fighting face-to-face, viewed those who fought from afar with universal disdain—skirmishers, javelin throwers, and above all, archers.5
The Greeks left an indelible stamp on Western society with their contributions to civics, law, and government. Their influence on modern warfare is equally striking—and in some eyes, disturbing. In The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece, Victor Davis Hanson explores this issue in detail. Although the Greek convention of limiting war strictly to combatant hoplites is not relevant today, the spirit of Hellenic warfare is alive and well in the minds of Western strategists.6 According to Hanson, although the Greeks eventually realized that pitched battle was not always the most efficient form of war, such fighting retained its usefulness by “providing a decisive (and glorious) conclusion.… The Greek’s stark way of battle left us with what is now a burdensome legacy in the West: a presumption that battle under any guise other than a no-nonsense head-to-head confrontation between sober enemies is or should be
unpalatable.”7
The Clausewitzian quest for decisive battle and the “principles of war” taught
throughout the professional military education system, are direct descendants of Greek
culture. As taught by the U.S. military, the principles of war are essentially a cookbook
approach to corral any enemy into a position where American firepower can be brought
to bear so we can destroy him, return to the normal state of peace, and go home.
These principles assume that battlefield victory is relevant in itself, making few
allowances for an enemy who practices a “live to fight another day” strategy, and,
through sheer obstinacy and will, survives. For many in the U.S. military, the disturbing
legacy of the Vietnam War is not that we failed to recognize the true non-Western nature
of the conflict, but rather that politicians prohibited warfighters from fully applying the
principles of war to our enemy.8
In many ways, Americans continue to view limited war as the British did a
century ago when taming the African colonies. As John Ellis writes in The Social
History of the Machine Gun, “Regular soldiers who went overseas…regarded the
Africans as weird eccentrics, hardly even human beings, they would look on colonial
warfare as an amusing diversion with little in common with real war.”9 Technology (in
the form of the Maxim gun) was a godsend for these good citizens of the world: “In
ancient times…civilized communities could hardly defend themselves against poor and
barbarous races…. In our day it is the poor and barbarous tribes who are everywhere at
the mercy of the wealthy and cultivated nations.10

Security K 1NC 4/6
Certainly, the British took their sense of fair play to any war they waged, and this too has firm roots in the U.S. military. While superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the following verse inscribed on the portal of the school gymnasium:
Upon the fields of friendly strife
are sown the seeds
that, upon other fields, on other days
will bear the fruits of victory.11
Teamwork, camaraderie, and esprit de corps have a definite place in any conflict, but also implicit in the quatrain is the concept of sportsmanship. One of the primary reasons Americans disdain guerillas, terrorists, and irregulars is that they do not “fight fair.” Time and again, the “dirty” tactics of these groups surprises the American military, yet little is learned from the experience.12 When the next conflict arises, Americans assume that the Marquis of Queensbury Rules are back in effect.
With the inertia of 2,500 years of Western culture behind it, there is little wonder the U.S. military is frequently shocked when war differs from Western expectations. While airpower advocates view their tool as revolutionary, they have actually done little more than secure a niche in the conventional Western way of waging war. Like the Greeks, air strategists yearn for decisiveness. Towards that end, the United States has invested in generation after generation of the finest technology available to find, fix, target, track, and destroy our enemies. But when confronted with the skirmishers, javelin throwers, and archers of the 20th Century, airpower has been far less than decisive.
As this century closes, many pundits speculate that with the advent of nuclear weapons and global interdependence, Western-style war has become extinct. But as Victor Davis Hanson warns, “The legacy of the Greeks’ battle style lingers on, a narcotic that we cannot put away.”13 The future of warfare cannot be seen in the hulks of Iraqi tanks, rather it can be found lurking in Haitian slums, Albanian villages, and Islamic pressure-cookers. In the next century, air strategists will continue to search for decisive results, but they may find greater success if they depend more on the advice of psychologists, sociologists, and linguists, and less on targeteers and technologists.

Security K 1NC 5/6
America’s obsession with trying to prevent and stop conflict – fueled by the fear of vulnerability and the unknown legitimizes violent acts to take place in the name of security eventually leading to inevitable extinction.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are energized by versions of intense idealism; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American "infidels." Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I've come to think of as "superpower syndrome." By that term I mean a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate; the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world's only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower’s victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are never absent in any part of the world. -- The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy.

Security K 1NC 6/6
The Alternative is to vote negative – the text is to begin our interrogations of security by refusing the affirmative’s quest for stability.
Accepting and living with ambiguity and vulnerability is key to preventing violence.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America’s Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.


States CP

Text: The state and federal territorial governments should offer businesses substantial positive financial incentives for the construction of nuclear power plants that use Light Water Reactors in the United States


States are already starting to provide monetary incentives for nuclear energy companies.
Triangle Business Journal, 4-30-08, “GE-Hitachi promises 900 new jobs for N.C.”, http://www.bizjournals.com/ triangle/stories/2008/04/28/ daily25.html?ana=from_rss
GE-**__Hitachi__** Nuclear Energy could receive more than $25 million in state incentives to create 900 jobs at its campus near Wilmington, Gov. Mike Easley's office says.
The company, a joint venture of **General Electric** (NYSE: GE) and Hitachi (NYSE: HIT), already employs more than 2,000 people in New Hanover County. The expansion would add manufacturing, training, simulation and testing facilities at GE-Hitachi's 1,300-acre campus.
Part of the expansion could include a commercial uranium enrichment facility, says GE-Hitachi, which manufactures parts for nuclear reactors and provides services to nuclear companies. The company is currently testing its enrichment process, which uses lasers, at its coastal facility. It has non-binding letters of agreement with large nuclear operators Exelon (NYSE: EXC) and **Entergy** (NYSE: ETR) for the enrichment.
Workers in the new jobs will be paid an average of $85,000 a year, plus benefits, Easley's office says. That's more than double the New Hanover County average of $33,226.
The company also received a $900,000 grant from the One North Carolina economic development fund, and it's receiving more than $10 million in local incentives.

Politics (1/2)

A. Uniqueness - Obama is winning because he can control the framing on energy
Andrew Ward, 6-22-08
“Energy concerns could swing Ohio result”, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 235879bc-4098-11dd-bd48- 0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid= f2b40164-cfea-11dc-9309- 0000779fd2ac.htm[Ian Miller]
Richard Daley hoped he would spend more time at his Kentucky vacation home in retirement. Instead, the 60-year-old former engineer, has cut his number of visits by half because of the soaring cost of driving the 200 miles from his home in West Chester, Ohio. “On a fixed income, we just can’t keep absorbing these increases,” he says. Mr Daley is one of millions of Americans rethinking their approach to energy consumption as petrol prices hit record levels. According to the Department of Transportation, US drivers travelled 30bn fewer miles between November and April, compared with a year earlier, the biggest drop since the 1979 energy crisis. While Mr Daley’s story is increasingly familiar, his carries added weight because he lives in one of the most important battleground states in November’s presidential election. His heavily Republican county on the edge of Cincinnati helped deliver George W. Bush’s narrow victory in Ohio four years ago and John McCain needs to win by a big margin there if he is to hold the state. Describing himself as an undecided independent, Mr Daley supports Mr McCain’s plan to lift the ban on fresh offshore oil and gas drilling around the US coast. But he also favours Barack Obama’s proposal to levy a windfall profit tax on oil companies and invest the proceeds in renewable fuels: “We need to exploit all the oil we have, but, in the long term, we have to find alternatives,” says Mr Daley. Energy has soared towards the top of the election agenda as petrol prices have topped $4 a gallon for the first time. Three in four voters say the issue will be “very important” in determining their vote – outranking taxes, terrorism and the Iraq war – according to a recent poll by the Pew Research Centre. Asked who they trusted most to handle the energy issue, respondents favoured Mr Obama over Mr McCain by 18 percentage points.Voters are making the simple conclusion that if you change the party in the White House somehow things will get better,” says Larry Sabato, a political scientist at the University of Virginia.

B. Link -
1. Incentives for nuclear power are popular with the public
WNN 08 (World Nuclear News, April 29, 2008, Opinion favours nuclear, __http://www.world-nuclear-news. org/NP-Opinion_favours_ nuclear_2904089.html__)
Unrelated surveys of public opinion have found continued support for the use of nuclear energy in both the USA and Russia, while US citizens are firmly in favour of federal incentives for the development of carbon-free energy options including nuclear. A survey of 1000 US citizens carried out by Bisconti Research and published by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) found broad support for possible future nuclear construction projects, strong support for the continued use of the country's existing nuclear plants, and even stronger support for the use of federal incentives to promote the development carbon-free energy technologies including advanced-design nuclear power plants. Eighty-four percent of those polled agreed that the USA should take advantage of all low-carbon energy sources including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy, with nearly 80% feeling that financial incentives such as tax credits should be used to help push the development of such technologies. Some 78% agreed that electricity companies should be preparing now so that nuclear plants could be built in the next decade, if needed, while 59% agreed that the US should "definitely" build more nuclear power plants. Overall, 63% of those surveyed favoured the use of nuclear energy in the USA, with 33% opposing it, with the proportion of people "strongly" in favour, at 28%, double the 14% who described themselves as strongly opposed to nuclear.

Politics (2/2)

2. Low Bush popularity is a death knell – improving his ratings boosts McCain
By Dick Morris, a political analyst for Fox and a columnist for the Hill, 5/18/2008, Obama Has the Upper Hand. But McCain Can Still Take Him, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 05/16/AR2008051603729_pf.html [ND]
Which brings us to George W. Bush, the least popular president of modern times. Unlikely as it sounds, the soon-to-be former president needs to get out of the White House, reenter the political arena (much as it will pain him) and go around the country telling us two things: First, we are winning in Iraq; second, the economy is not as bad as most people think. With the Dow at around 12,800 and unemployment at 5 percent, Bush can make a good case that things aren't really headed for the rocks. And he'll have to. Republicans cannot win with an incumbent president with rock-bottom ratings. Bush can help McCain, but that doesn't mean that McCain should support Bush. As Bush makes the case for himself, McCain must put distance between them. A lot of distance. Once, McCain ran against Bush. But since then, he has basked in the glow of Bush's warm welcome back to the mainstream of the party. Now McCain needs to free himself of Bush's spell, go out again into the cold and show the country the difference between his agenda and Bush's.
C. Impact –
1. Obama would remove all troops from Iraq within 16 months, which would allow redeployment in other areas
Perry Bacon Jr.,
July 14, 2008, Washington Post “Obama Reaffirms Iraq Withdrawal Plan, Sparking a Fresh Round of McCain Camp Criticism” http://blog.washingtonpost. com/the-trail/2008/07/14/ obama_reaffirms_iraq_ withdrawa.html
Barack Obama is strongly reaffirming his stance on pulling combat troops out of Iraq in his first 16 months in office, if elected president, emboldened by the Iraqi government saying last week it supports a timetable for U.S. forces to leave.

"The call by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki for a timetable for the removal of American troops from Iraq presents an enormous opportunity," Obama wrote today in a New York Times op-ed. "We should seize this moment to begin the phased redeployment of combat troops that I have long advocated, and that is needed for long-term success in Iraq and the security interests of the United States." 

Maliki's comments have left Obama increasing focused on the withdrawal part of his Iraq strategy, instead of the troops he would leave there to maintain stability, which he had emphasized in the last few weeks as the general election has started. Obama still has not said how large of a force he would leave in Iraq, as ten of thousands of the forces in Iraq are not "combat troops" and could remain in the country even if Obama removed all combat forces. 

But his emphasis on withdrawal is likely to quiet critics who said he appeared to be changing his position on getting troops out of Iraq. "My core position, which is that we need a timetable for withdraw ... is now a position that is held by the Iraqi government itself," he told reporters on his campaign plane Saturday night. "...John McCain and George Bush both said that if Iraq as a sovereign government stated that it was time for us to start withdrawing our troops they would respect the wishes of that sovereign government.
2. STRONG MILITARY READINESS IS CRITICAL TO MAINTAIN U.S. HEGEMONY
Owens ? associate dean of academics and professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College ? 2006 (Mackubin Thomas, in Newport, R.I., as well as a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, "A Balanced Force Structure to Achieve a Liberal World Order," January 20, __www.fpri.org/enotes/20060120. military.owens. balancedforcestructure.html__)
Primacy and the Logic of Force Planning A strategy of primacy requires a balanced force that can be employed across the spectrum of conflict and prevail under diverse circumstances against adversaries employing a variety of strategies, including conventional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive approaches. These forces must be able not only to prevail in war, but also reassure friends and allies and generally influence actors in those parts of the world of the greatest importance to the US, especially Eurasia.
These forces must be capable of operating jointly in all operational environments: land, sea, air, space, and across the electromagnetic spectrum, both now and in the future. Accordingly, while remaining of sufficient size and composition both to fight and win major theater wars and carry out constabulary operations in the present, this force structure must also be flexible enough to exploit new technologies, doctrine, organization, and operational concepts in order to maintain military preeminence in the future.


Solvency


Nuclear power is encouraged by the government to mask military use.
Alan Roberts, instructor of physics and environmental science @ Monash University, 10-13-05, “Unsafe, unsound, and unattainable”, http://www.theage.com.au/news/ business/unsafe-unsound-and- unattainable/2005/10/12/ 1128796587593.html, [CXia]
These findings emerge from careful studies. Governments know that nuclear power is no magic bullet for the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. So why have government leaders in the US, Britain, France and China advocated nuclear power — sometimes quite forcefully? Because it is an industry essential to sustainability — of the military rather than the environmental kind. Governments with a nuclear arsenal need the services of a nuclear industry. Quite aside from the expanded risks of a nuclear accident — especially in poorly regulated areas such as the developing world or the US — there would be the increased risk of plutonium theft, and the more rigorous security apparatus governments would need to create to counter it. It should be obvious that if you're worried about "dirty bomb" terrorism, you shouldn't scatter nuclear plants around as if they were coffee shop chains.

Nuclear leadership

1. Privatization of nuclear supply results in proliferation
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center’s Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author
In effect, nonproliferation was trumped by globalization. Production capabilities for nuclear weapons development became merely another set of commodities to be moved and sold like any other. Although the scope of Khan’s operations was revealed in a series of investigations following the interdiction of the ship BBC China, the Libyan decision to abandon its nuclear program and open its facilities to inspection further demonstrated the extent of the Khan network. It is not surprising, therefore, that many observers remain concerned that the A. Q. Khan network has not been fully dismantled; it is also possible that the network is simply one of several that existed and the others continue to operate below the radar. Even if this is not the case, observation of other criminal and black market networks suggests that even when a network is very seriously degraded it can still regenerate itself. This capacity is often accompanied by an ability 1) to adapt in ways that overcome or circumvent constraints, 2) to morph into new forms that are difficult to detect, and 3) to learn from mistakes. Consequently, the privatization of nuclear supply networks is likely to continue to pose a major challenge to efforts to maintain the nonproliferation regime.
This brief and inevitably superficial survey of the evolution of nuclear proliferation reveals several distinct trends:
-the inability of the United States and the international community to maintain an effective nonproliferation regime;
-the growing difficulty of controlling technology diffusion in an era of globalization and dual-use technologies;
-the increased role of non-state actors, be they a) networks of scientists driven by desires for personal enrichment, senses of obligation to support Islamic nations seeking to augment their military power, or resentment toward U.S. efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, or b) criminal networks concerned only with profit.
Against this background, it is necessary to examine the role of the United States intelligence community in responding to the new challenges of what might be termed complex nuclear proliferation.


2. The proliferation environment has changed making it impossible for the U.S. to identify prolif channels and methods
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center’s Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author
As nuclear proliferation has become a more serious and urgent problem—both in terms of actual and would-be proliferators and the increased diversity of proliferation channels and methods—the performance of U. S. intelligence in meeting the challenge has appeared to be increasingly inadequate. The failure to foresee the Indian nuclear test, the underestimation of the Iraqi nuclear program prior to the Gulf War of 1991, the over-estimation of Iraq’s program prior to the U.S.–led invasion of 2003, and the failure to detect many of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network throughout the 1990s all suggest that major efforts need to be made to reform the intelligence community in general and its handling of the problems of nuclear proliferation (and terrorism) in particular.
The focus of public attention has largely been on the false positives that appeared to justify the invasion of Iraq. Yet, it is arguable that the failure to provide early detection of the operations of the A.Q. Khan network was an equally important intelligence failure—and one where the constraints on intelligence collection and analysis were not as formidable as in Iraq. At the same time, the failure to detect the activities of the Khan network is understandable. The proliferation environment has changed significantly, becoming much more complex and posing more difficult challenges than in the past.

3. It’s impossible to stop the nuclear proliferation system, it evolves and circumvents at attempts of prevention
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center’s Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author
Following the earlier discussion of surprise, it is necessary to think much more explicitly about both buyers and suppliers in a nuclear proliferation system. Specifically, consideration needs to be given to those entities, both state and non-state, seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as those entities—states, firms, individuals, and criminal organizations—that wittingly or unwittingly, become involved in the supply of knowledge, materials, or production equipment that facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nuclear proliferation system is co-evolving in a fitness landscape with nonproliferation policies, strategies, norms, and institutions. Consequently, it is adapting in ways that circumvent the constraints and restrictions imposed by nonproliferation efforts. Its continued ability to do this depends on the relative capacity of each side for learning.
How might proliferation networks morph in the future? It is clear that proliferation networks and their relationships, commodity flows, and financial flows constantly morph in response to pressures and opportunities. One possibility, therefore, is to think in terms of multiple networks—each with its own distinct characteristics and approach (within technological constraints) to facilitating nuclear weapons development. In a world of inter-connectedness, it is also necessary to consider the possibility of some kind of association or linkage between criminal networks which have obtained access to fissionable material and a network akin to that of A.Q. Khan.

4. There are three alt causes: lack of probing markets, market perturbations, and probing supply networks
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, Director of the Ridgway Center’s Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, consultant to both the United Nations and United States government agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional testimony on the subject, Dr. Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Financing of Terrorism. He is also focusing on methods of degrading criminal and terrorist networks, July 2006, Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Understanding and Probing Complexity, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ si/2006/Jul/williamsJul06.asp# author
Taking this injunction and applying it to complex proliferation, it is possible to identify at least three kinds of probing strategies and targets: 1) probing the market in ways that help determine the dynamics of both supply and demand and elicit knowledge about the operation of supplier networks.2) creating market perturbations that lead to adaptive responses, the patterns of which can be delineated and assessed; and 3) probing the supply networks to identify critical nodes and connections, determine degrees of redundancy and resilience, and identify ways in which the networks morph when under pressure.
Perhaps the most effective way of probing the illicit nuclear proliferation market is to engage in undercover operations. Such operations can prove critical in obtaining information and developing knowledge about the market, the key players, key financial transactions, and transportation routes and methods. Undercover operations could help clarify: the nature and extent of networks of traffickers and legal companies which provide machine tools and other goods necessary for nuclear weapons development; the modes of transportation and the methods of concealment or diversion; the ways in which traffickers and commercial firms link up with buyers; and the kinds of prices that prevail for certain kinds of materials and equipment. Such operations can utilize informants, controlled deliveries, front companies, ostensible financial institutions to provide services to the proliferation networks, and infiltration of the scientific and business communities. Although all these approaches can be helpful in knowledge acquisition, probably the most far-reaching undercover operation the controlled delivery. This technique allows the process to be traced from initial supply to final customer and, if done well, can provide enormous insight.
A second approach is to create perturbations. This can be achieved through seizures and interdiction that are carried out not for their denial effects, but for the adaptive responses they generate in those involved in nuclear proliferation. With care and effort, it might be possible to discover the patterns inherent in such responses and, from there, discern broader patterns of behavior. Creating perturbation, of course, requires a certain knowledge base in order to be effective and, therefore, is likely to follow, rather than precede, probing designed for knowledge elicitation.
A third approach is to probe the supply networks, identifying and removing critical nodes, and observe how the network reacts to the attack. For example, the removal of a supplier of key parts will provoke a search for substitute suppliers, substitute parts, or alternative production methods. It is important to emphasize that probing the network in this way is not synonymous with degrading the network. Rather, is it an attempt to provoke the network into actions that inadvertently reveal key aspects of its topology, functional and role specialization, degree of clustering, capacity for adaptation, and the like. In this sense, as suggested in the discussion of strategic network analysis, probing will often be a precursor to more effective degradation strategies based on greater knowledge and understanding.