ISPEC

A. The aff must specify the type of incentive they use.
Incentive specification key to policymaking and disad links
David M Driesen. Spring 98. "Is emissions trading an economic incentive program?: Replacing the command and control/economic incentive dichotomy," Washington and Lee Law review http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_qa3655/is_199804/ ai_n8791954/print [Takumi Murayama]

Any meaningful theory of economic incentives must address several key questions. What precisely does a proposed program provide incentives to do? Who will create the incentives? A theory that focuses on these questions helps analyze claims that emissions trading offers free market-like dynamic advantages - inducement of innovation and continuous environmental improvement - central to its attractiveness. It clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of traditional regulation. It shows that much more useful things can be done with the concept of economic incentives than trade emission reduction obligations. A theory of economic incentives may help create more dynamic and effective environmental law.

B. The aff fails to specify what type of incentive they use.

C. Standards -

1. Limits–Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. The term "alternative energy" is already unlimiting enough we should at least get to know what type of incentive the affirmative is using to limit the topic. Key CP ground is lost; the aff should be able to defend the type of incentive they do in the plan.

2. Predictability–It's totally unpredictable what the 1AC becomes in the 2AC after the addition of add-ons; there is already in-round abuse from the 1AC, since the aff strat after the 1AC can change 180°.

D. T is a voter for fairness and education. The way the aff defines the round does not reward strategic thinking where the neg can run solvency deficits or counterplans on "incentives" and decrease education on in-depth debates about incentives.




T – in the US

A. Interpretations
"In" means within the bounds of
American Heritage, 6 4th edition
In: a. Within the limits, bounds, or area of: was hit in the face; born in the spring; a chair in the garden.








. They increase incentives for alternative energy in space.




they claim advantages off of space colonization and doing things in space.

DAs, particularly elections. By not increasing alternative energy in the US, it means that our generic links don't matter.



Security K

Our fear of the "inevitable attack" on the US allows descisons to be made on lies and deception to instill fear into the public justifying our actions in the name of national security
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America's Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Our invasion of Iraq reflects the web of deception that the Bush administration, through its "war on terrorism," has woven around the events of that September morning. By all objective evidence Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, but as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested on the day after the attacks, the broad definition of that "war" would require us to invade Iraq. At that moment, Iraq rose to the surface from the deeper dreams and visions of our leaders— and so the moment became one of opportunity. To facilitate that policy our leaders then either made, or encouraged by innuendo, the false claim that Iraq was indeed implicated in 9/11, and by the time of the invasion about 50 percent of Americans had come to believe that falsehood. A deception on such a large scale could only occur because Americans remained genuinely fearful of terrorist attacks even more lethal than 9/11, and because that fear, that sense of vulnerability, could be manipulated to support larger and more ambitious policy aims. It became possible to redirect the fear from Osama bin Laden to another hated Middle Eastern figure, Saddam Hussein, to the point where the two became virtually interchangeable. If anything, American fear of another 9/11 has been intensified by the "successful" invasion and so remains available for use in other situations.



The paranoia of inevitable annihilation associated with superpower syndrome – legitimizes violence under the mask of "security".
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America's Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

Inseparable from this grandiosity is the paranoid edge of the apocalyptic mindset. Leader and followers feel themselves constantly under attack—threatened not just with harm but with annihilation. For them that would mean the obliteration of everything of value on this degraded planet, of the future itself. They must destroy the world in order to survive themselves. This is why they in turn feel impelled to label as absolute evil and annihilate any group that seems to impede their own sacred mission. Such a sense of paranoid aggressiveness is more readily detectable in the case of certified zealots like Asahara or bin Laden. But it is by no means absent from the minds of American strategists who, though possessing overwhelming military dominance, express constant fear of national annihilation, and embark upon aggressive or "preemptive" military actions.




















America's obsession with trying to prevent and stop conflict – fueled by the fear of vulnerability and the unknown legitimizes violent acts to take place in the name of security eventually leading to inevitable extinction.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America's Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are energized by versions of intense idealism; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American "infidels." Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I've come to think of as "superpower syndrome." By that term I mean a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate; the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world's only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower's victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are never absent in any part of the world. -- The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy.







The Alternative is to vote negative – the text is to begin our interrogations of security by refusing the affirmative's quest for stability.


Accepting and living with ambiguity and vulnerability is key to preventing violence.
Robert Jay Lifton, American psychiatrist and author, chiefly known for his studies of the psychological causes and effects of war and political violence and for his theory of thought reform. He was an early proponent of the techniques of psychohistory, 2003, Superpower Syndrom: America's Violent Confrontation with the World, book ocr.

To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.



States CP

THE STATE AND FEDERAL TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SPACE-BASED SOLAR POWER SATELLITES.



Elections DA

1. Obama is winning because he can control the framing on energy
Andrew Ward, 6-22-08
"Energy concerns could swing Ohio result", http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 235879bc-4098-11dd-bd48- 0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid= f2b40164-cfea-11dc-9309- 0000779fd2ac.htm[Ian Miller]
Richard Daley hoped he would spend more time at his Kentucky vacation home in retirement. Instead, the 60-year-old former engineer, has cut his number of visits by half because of the soaring cost of driving the 200 miles from his home in West Chester, Ohio. "On a fixed income, we just can't keep absorbing these increases," he says. Mr Daley is one of millions of Americans rethinking their approach to energy consumption as petrol prices hit record levels. According to the Department of Transportation, US drivers travelled 30bn fewer miles between November and April, compared with a year earlier, the biggest drop since the 1979 energy crisis. While Mr Daley's story is increasingly familiar, his carries added weight because he lives in one of the most important battleground states in November's presidential election. His heavily Republican county on the edge of Cincinnati helped deliver George W. Bush's narrow victory in Ohio four years ago and John McCain needs to win by a big margin there if he is to hold the state. Describing himself as an undecided independent, Mr Daley supports Mr McCain's plan to lift the ban on fresh offshore oil and gas drilling around the US coast. But he also favours Barack Obama's proposal to levy a windfall profit tax on oil companies and invest the proceeds in renewable fuels: "We need to exploit all the oil we have, but, in the long term, we have to find alternatives," says Mr Daley. Energy has soared towards the top of the election agenda as petrol prices have topped $4 a gallon for the first time. Three in four voters say the issue will be "very important" in determining their vote – outranking taxes, terrorism and the Iraq war – according to a recent poll by the Pew Research Centre. Asked who they trusted most to handle the energy issue, respondents favoured Mr Obama over Mr McCain by 18 percentage points. "Voters are making the simple conclusion that if you change the party in the White House somehow things will get better," says Larry Sabato, a political scientist at the University of Virginia.




2. The plan dooms Obama. McCain will pounce on a new energy policy to revitalize the GOP brand – it will tip the election
(Theo Caldwell, President of Caldwell Asset Management, Inc/ investment advisor in the United States and Canada, 6-17-08, "Theo Caldwell: If the Republicans promise to cut fuel costs, 2008 could be their year", http://network.nationalpost. com/np/blogs/fullcomment/ archive/2008/06/17/theo- caldwell-if-the-republicans- promise-to-cut-fuel-costs- 2008-could-be-their-year.aspx, [Ian Miller])
Drill here, drill now, pay less. This is the mantra of former U.S. speaker of the house Newt Gingrich, whose American Solutions policy group is campaigning for America to begin tapping its own oil resources to combat high gas prices. For all the environmental constraints the U.S. government has placed on domestic oil production (China and Cuba are drilling closer to the U.S. coastline than American companies are allowed to do), polls show Americans would rather pay less for gasoline than fight global warming. Indeed, the price of gas now permeates almost every policy discussion, from foreign affairs to inflation. As we approach the 2008 elections, whichever presidential candidate and party conjures a cogent energy plan — incorporating domestic drilling and defying environmental alarmism — will be rewarded. At first glance, it would seem that spiralling gas prices and frustration at the pumps would hurt the incumbent party. Notwithstanding the Democrats' majorities in both houses of Congress, it is the Republican party that the public identifies with incumbency, saddled as they are with an unpopular president who catches blame for everything from poor Iraq war planning to inclement weather. But the religious environmental zealotry of much of the Democrats' base makes them the party of windmills and stern lectures, not practical solutions. Congressional Democrats have contented themselves with browbeating today's most politically correct villains, oil executives, while reflexively voting down any proposed energy solution, from domestic drilling to nuclear power. The Democrats' presidential candidate, Senator Barack Obama, has suggested that high energy costs might carry the benefit of forcing America to change its gluttonous ways, recently chiding his countrymen: "We can't drive our SUVs and eat as much as we want and keep our homes on 72 degrees at all times ... and then just expect that other countries are going to say OK." Americans did not win the Cold War so they would have to consult Sweden before setting their thermostats. This kind of thinking is anathema to the Land of the Free, and it opens the door for the GOP to capitalize on the energy issue. In 1994, Gingrich's Republicans achieved a majority in Congress through a simple, common sense platform known as the Contract with America. A one-page roster of eight reforms and 10 proposed Acts, the Contract neatly answered voters' principal questions of those who seek to govern. To wit, who are you, what do you hope to accomplish, and how will you do it? In 2008, with energy prices fixing to become the top election issue, combining foreign and domestic policy concerns into a monstrous hybrid of a problem, an understandable and workable proposal could help the GOP again. If every Republican running for office, from freshman House candidates to their presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, spoke with a single, sensible voice on this issue, they could snatch victory from defeat. A first draft might read: "We are Americans too, and we know that energy prices have gotten out of hand. We want to reduce fuel costs for all of us, and cut the number of dollars we send to hostile, oil-producing countries in the Middle East and South America. If you elect us, we will do the following three things: We will begin to tap America's vast oil reserves, using technological drilling advances that protect the environment. We will also promote alternative energy sources, such as nuclear power, to move us away from an oil-based economy. Finally, we will eliminate barriers to the import of cheaper, more efficient automotive systems that have been successful in other parts of the world." If the Republicans agree on such a platform, 2008 could be their year after all.




3. McCain will implement NMD.

John Isaacs, July 01, 2008 News Blaze "McCain vs. Obama on National Security" http://newsblaze.com/story/ 20080701161430tsop.nb/ topstory.html
In 2001, the Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and since then has moved swiftly to deploy national missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California. The latest fiscal budget request for 2009 is $12.3 billion for all forms of missile defense. McCain has declared that he "strongly supports the development and deployment of theater and national missile defenses." His votes in the Senate back up that claim: he opposed all three amendments to cut the program in 2004. In a 2001 speech to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, he advocated abandoning the ABM Treaty. Obama has been critical of the Bush missile defense plans: "The Bush Administration has in the past exaggerated missile defense capabilities and rushed deployments for political purposes." Obama voted for an amendment offered by Sen. Carl Levin in 2005 (the last major vote on missile defense) while McCain missed the vote. Obama has not indicated plans for missile defense upon assuming the presidency. Missile defense site in Europe: McCain has also been clear in his support for a third missile defense site in Europe that is bitterly opposed by Russia. Congress cut a portion of the funding for the program in 2007 in advance of approval from the two Central European countries. In an October 2007 debate, McCain said: "I don't care what [President Vladimir Putin's] objections are to it." He has also described the system as a "hedge against potential threats" from Russia and China
4. Deployment of the European missile defense causes Russian retaliation with nuclear weapons
London Times, June 4, 2007 ([Bapodra])
President Putin has warned the US that its deployment of a new anti-missile network across Eastern Europe would prompt Russia to point its own missiles at European targets and could trigger nuclear war. In an exclusive interview with The Times, the Russian leader says: "It is obvious that if part of the strategic nuclear potential of the US is located in Europe and will be threatening us, we will have to respond. "This system of missile defence on one side and the absence of this system on the other ... increases the possibility of unleashing a nuclear conflict."


Fiscal Discipline DA

A. Bush and the Blue Dogs are holding the line on fiscal disc
Housing Wire,7/15/2008, "Bush: Congress Needs to Move on Housing Bill", http://www.housingwire.com/ 2008/07/15/bush-congress- needs-to-move-on-housing-bill/ , BB

The largest source of Bush's veto threat had centered around a proposed provision in the Senate that would add $3.9 billion in Community Development Block Grant funding to allow local governments to purchase foreclosed and abandoned real estate for use as affordable housing. The House version of the package contains no such provision, and so-called "Blue Dog" Democrats — a name given to a group of conservative Democrats in the House — have been strongly opposed to the measure, as well.
B. "Must pass" bills collapse fiscal discipline
Istook et Al., a Visiting Fellow in Government Relations at The Heritage Foundation, served 14 years in the U.S. House of Representatives and was chairman of a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Ernest Istook, Nicola Moore, Baker Spring and Alison Acosta Fraser, May 2, 2007, "Post-Veto War Supplemental Must Eliminate Pork and Support Troops", http://www.heritage.org/ Research/Budget/wm1440.cfm, BB

A series of short-term supplemental bills would also destroy any hope of Members' exercising the fiscal discipline that this Congress has promised to provide. In the vetoed supplemental, Congress stuffed in an extra $20 billion of non-emergency spending, much of which likely would not survive outside of "must pass" legislation. Although some special-interest spending was taken out in the conference committee, there was still plenty to beef about: $1.4 billion to the livestock industry, hundreds of millions for dairy producers, $60 million for salmon fisheries, a $650 million SCHIP bailout to states that irresponsibly expanded their programs,[3] plus billions more for programs whose value could be debated--all told, $21 billion more than President's original request. As Charlie Rangel openly admitted on Meet the Press, most of that pork added to the supplemental was used to buy votes. Increasing the number of short-term supplemental appropriations will only serve to increase the extent to which the leadership will need to grease the skids with more pork projects in order to buy more votes to pass the series of supplementals. This two-month strategy would make it all the more vital for the President to require fiscal responsibility by eliminating special-interest projects and parochial spending.
C. Internal Link--Lack of Fiscal Discipline leads to Economic Collapse
Gerald J. Swanson, Professor; Thomas R. Brown Chair in Economic Education @ Eller College, America the Broke, 2004, pg. 13, BB

Because foreign investors view the dollar as nothing more than another asset they buy in hopes of making a return, increasing economic turmoil in the United States would probably provoke them to sell some, if not all, of their dollar assets, causing the currency's value to drop farther. As this vicious cycle gathered speed, foreign investors might quit buying Treasury securities altogether. They might even start cashing in the bonds they already held. That would force the government to print the money it couldn't borrow—a surefire trigger for inflation and another blow to the value of the dollar. What would happen then? We can only guess, because such a debacle has never occurred in modern times. At the very least, the United States—and because of our wide-ranging influence the rest of the world, too—would be plunged into economic chaos, all because of our unwillingness to reign in our reckless spending.



D. Impact- Economic Collapse leads to Nuclear War
Walter Russell Mead, Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Depending on the Kindness of Strangers," New Perspectives Quarterly 9.3 (Summer 1992) pp. 28-30.

Hundreds of millions—billions—of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles—and drawn closer to the West—because they believe our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates—or even shrinks? In that case we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India—these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world order than Germany and Japan did in the '30s


AT: Colonization Adv.

A. Space exploration and colonization sparks weaponization and global arms race.

Bruce Gagnon. Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, No date given (Bruce K., "Statement of Concern," http:/lwww.space4peace.org/ statement/concern.htm)
But there are obstacles to U.S. space "dominance". Present international space law speaks against the notion of U.S. space control. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, signed by the U.S. and 90 other countries, affirms "the peaceful purposes" of outer space and forbids "weapons of mass destruction" from being deployed in space.
This same space law also declares that all interplanetary bodies belong to the common good. As NASA lands on the moon and Mars and explores other planets they are finding
gold, cobalt, magnesium, helium 3 and other rich resources. Plans are now underway to place mining colonies on these bodies. The U.S. is now exploring ways to circumvent international space law in order to "exploit" these planetary bodies so that corporate interests may secure the enormous financial benefits expected from this Mining the Sky as is described by NASA scientist John Lewis in his book by the same title. The Columbus mythology is often invoked to describe our "manifest destiny" as it relates to space exploration and colonization. The noble explorer theme is used to cover the more practical notion of profits to be made in regards to space. There is big money to be made building and launching rockets. There is money to be made building and launching satellites. There is money and power to be derived by "controlling" space. And there is money to be made mining the sky. Another obstacle exists though. If the U.S. can "control" space, so might another nation. Thus we have the early stages of an arms race in space. How will France, Russia, China or any other nation respond as the U.S. consolidates its "control" of space? In order to ensure that the Pentagon maintains its current space military superiority the U.S. Space Command is now developing new war fighting technologies like the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Anti-satellite weapons (ASATS) as well as space based laser weapons. Star Wars is alive and well. Recent efforts to move toward early deployment of the BMD system, which could easily be used for offensive purposes, is expected to break the 1972 ABM Treaty as well as the Outer Space Treaty.






B. Space weaponization makes nuclear war inevitable.
Gordon Mitchell et al, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburg, 7/2001. ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense no. 6, , http://web.archive.org/web/ 20061003055940/http://www .isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/ uk/bmd/no6.html
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 Thisdrift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'antiballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen


AT: Hegemony Adv.

1. Imperial overstretch and a declining economy doom US heg – empirically proven.
Jeffrey Frankel, Harpel Professor of capital formation and growth, Harvard University, Journal of Policy Modeling, 2006, http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~ jfrankel/ SalvatoreDeficitsHegemonJan26J ul.pdf

The decline in the pound was clearly part of a larger pattern whereby the United Kingdom lost its economic pre-eminence, colonies, military power, and other trappings of international hegemony. As some of us wonder whether the United States might now have embarked on a path of "imperial over-reach," following the British Empire down a road of widening federal budget deficits and overly ambitious military adventures in the Muslim world, the fate of the pound is perhaps a useful caution. The Suez crisis of 1956 is frequently recalled as the occasion on which Britain was forced under US pressure to abandon its remaining imperial designs. But the important role played by a simultaneous run on the pound is often forgotten.10 Paul Kennedy (1989)'s suggestion of the imperial overreach hypothesis and its application to US hegemony may have been essentially correct but 20years premature, much like the forecasts of those in the early 1990s who warned prematurely of the dollar's imminent demise.
Over the last four decades, our allies have been willing to pay a financial price to support American leadership of the international economy, because they correctly saw it to be in their interests. In the 1960s, Germany was willing to offset the expenses of stationing U.S. troops on bases there so as to save the United States from a balance of payments deficit. In the 1980s, the U.S. military was charged less to station troops in high-rent Japan than if they had been based at home. In 1991, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and a number of other countries were willing to pay for the financial cost of the war against Iraq, thus temporarily wiping out the U.S. current account deficit for the only time in a twenty-year period. Repeatedly the Bank of Japan, among other central banks, has been willing to buy dollars to prevent the U.S. currency from depreciating (late 1960s, early 1970s, late 1980s).
During the same period that the United States has lost its budget surplus and the twin deficits have re-emerged, i.e., since 2001, we have also lost popular sympathy and political support in much of the rest of the world.11 In the past, deficits from imperial overstretch have been manageable because others have paid the bills for our troops overseas: Germany and Japan during the Cold War, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1991. Now the hegemon has lost its claim to legitimacy in the eyes of many. Next time the US asks other central banks to bail out the dollar, will they be as willing to do so as Europe was in the 1960s, or as Japan was in the late 1980s after the Louvre Agreement? I fear not.




2. Trying to sustain hegemony only prolongs the transition to a stable multipolar world
Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal, "Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?" Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, 1998 p. Proquest)

My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade, American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. The changing distribution of power in the international system--specifically, the relative decline of U.S. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers--will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. Over time, the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy, I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. Indeed, they may; however, that is only half of the argument. The other half, seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance, is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide; whether they are sustainable; their cost; the degree of risk they entail; and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. Any serious debate about U.S. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. This is unsurprising. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union's collapse, the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. "What ever happens will be for the worse," Salisbury said, "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible." However, it is the very fact of the Soviet Union's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as preferable to Soviet domination. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only because of the effects of bipolarity itself. Simply put, without the Cold War, America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. International politics is dynamic, not static. As Paul Kennedy has observed, "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others...." 30 The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century, America's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities, events will force it to do so


China
A. Heg makes it inevitable
Christopher Layne 07 Research Fellow @ the Independent Institute, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute
(American Empire: A Debate, p. 72-4)

The Bush II administration has not entirely abandoned engagement with Beijing, but—more openly than the Bush I and Clinton administrations—it has embraced containment of China as an alternative to engagement. Given the influence of neoconservative foreign policy intellectuals on the administration's grand strategy, this is unsurprising. After all, during the 1990s, leading neoconservatives were part of the so-called Blue Team of anti-China hardliners in the foreign policy community.' Containment is a strategy that emphasizes using the traditional hard power tools of statecraft to prevent China's great power emergence and maintain American primacy!' The heart of containment, however, lies in military power and alliance diplomacy. What, specifically, do primacists mean when they call for China's containment? First, they want the United States to pledge explicitly to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack and also to help Taiwan build up its own military capabilities. Primacists believe that the United States should not back away from confronting China over Taiwan and, indeed, they would like the United States to provoke such a showdown. They also want the United States to emulate its anti-Soviet Cold War strategy by assembling a powerful alliance of states that share a common interest in curbing rising Chinese power. As part of such a strategy, the United States should tighten its security relationship with Japan and invest it with an overtly anti-Chinese mission. Needless to say, primacists are determined that the United States maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority over China. Indeed, with respect to nuclear weapons, as Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have pointed out in an important Foreign Affairs article, the United States currently has an overwhelming nuclear first-strike capability against China, which will be augmented by the national ballistic missile defense system that the United States currently is deploying. Even if Beijing switches its military modernization priorities from its current conventional defense buildup to the enhancement of its strategic nuclear deterrent, it will take some time before China could offset the first-strike capability that the United States possesses. Advocates of containment hope that the various measures encompassed by this strategy will halt China's rise and preserve American primacy.73 However, as one leading proponent of containment argues, if these steps fail to stop China's great power emergence, "the United States should consider harsher measures."" That is, before its current military advantage over China is narrowed, the United States should launch a preventive war to forestall China's emergence as a peer competitor. Of course, in the abstract, preventive war always has been an option in great powers' strategic playbooks—typically as a strategy that declining great powers employ against rising challengers. However, it also is a strategy that also can appeal to a dominant power that still is on top of its game and is determined to squelch potential challengers before they become actual threats. In fact, preventive war (along with preemptive military strikes) is the grand strategic approach of the Bush II administration, as set out in its 2002 National Security Strategy (and reaffirmed by the administration in its 2006 National Security Strategy), and in policy statements by senior administration officials (including President George W. Bush himself). There is nothing in the logic of the administration's grand strategy doctrines of preventive war and preemptive action that suggests that it is applicable only to terrorist groups like al Qaeda and so-called rouge states (like Iran and North Korea). If anything, preventive strategies should be most appealing with respect to potential rivals like China—those who could become peer competitors of the United States. Here, the pramacists' fixation on defending Taiwan suggests that an American commitment to that island's defense is valued most because it could afford Washington a possible pretext to take on China in a preventive war. To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China's arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China's will be a "peaceful rise" is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the "last clear chance" to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.




B. Extinction
Straits Times, 2k (6/25, "Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan," lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.





Prolif
Fear of US hegemony leads to nuclear proliferation
Wilson Center, March 4, 2005 ("The Global Response to U.S. Primacy: Implications for Nonproliferation, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ index.cfm?event_id=110376& fuseaction=events.event_ summary)
Professor Walt discussed the main themes of his forthcoming book, Taming America: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (Norton, 2005). He focused, in particular, on how American global preeminence affects the proliferation choices of other countries. Walt argued that the adverse perception of American power reflected in opinion polls (e.g., the Pew Global Attitudes Project) stems from three sources: first, the sheer magnitude of American power relative to other states; second, opposition to specific U.S. policies (such as the preventive war in Iraq), and third, Washington's perceived double standard (e.g., tolerating nuclear proliferation in Israel while opposing it in Iran). Walt stated that states are either accommodating or resisting American power in this so-called era of unipolarity. The strategies of accommodation include: (1) "bandwagoning," or deflecting U.S. power through appeasement or acquiescence; (2) enlisting the United States to address regional security problems (e.g., Qatar); and (3) "bonding" or aligning with the United States to shape U.S. policy and gain concessions or prestige (e.g., British Prime Tony Blair's approach toward both the Clinton and Bush administrations). The strategies of resistance include: (1) balancing (as pursued diplomatically by the French, German and Russian governments in the United Nations during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War); (2) asymmetric responses – such as the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by "rogue states" in an effort to level the playing field with the United States; (3) "blackmail" (as North Korea is trying to do with its nuclear weapons program); (4) "balking" – just saying no (e.g., Russia's continuing nuclear relationship with Iran despite U.S. objections); and (5) delegitimation – attempting to portray U.S. actions as self-interested and illegitimate. Walt concluded that international concerns about U.S. power are undermining Washington's nonproliferation efforts.





Prolif will trigger preemptive nuclear wars around the planet
Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, "Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions," Survival, Summer, p. 87-90, 2002

Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.